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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

TOMAS R. HERRERA,

:

Defendant/Appellant,

Case No. 920209

:

and

:

MIKELL SWEEZEY,

:

Case No. 920209

:

Priority No. 11

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
State v. Herreraf Case No. 920209
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(3)(h) (1992).

This Court entered a minute entry granting

Defendant's petition for interlocutory review.

A copy of the minute

entry is contained in Addendum A.
State v. Sweezey, Case No. 920265
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(3)(b).

On June 2, 1992, the Court of Appeals certified the

petition for permission to file an interlocutory appeal to this
Court.

See Addendum B.
On August 4, 1992, this Court issued its order granting

interlocutory appeal in Sweezey and consolidating Sweezey and
Herrera for calendaring and oral argument.

See Addendum C.

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The text of the following statutes and constitutional

provisions is contained in Addendum D.
Article I, Section 7, Constitution of Utah;
Article I, Section 9, Constitution of Utah;
Article I, Section 12, Constitution of Utah;
Article I, Section 24, Constitution of Utah;
Amendment V, Constitution of the United States;
Amendment VIII, Constitution of the United States;
Amendment XIVf Constitution of the United States;
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 (1991);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-4 (1953 as amended);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103 (1953 as amended);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-104 (1953 as amended);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-203 (1953 as amended);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-204 (1953 as amended).
The text of former Utah statutes providing for a defense of
insanity are contained in Addendum E.

Those former statutes are:

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 (1973);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-41 (1953);
Revised Statutes § 103-1-40 (1933);
Utah Penal Code § 7915 (4071) (1917);
Title I, § 4387, Compiled Laws of Utah (1888);
Title I, Chapter 1852, § 22, Compiled Laws of
Territory of Utah (1876).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Does Utah's statutory scheme which allows a defense of

insanity only where insanity negates the mens rea violate federal
due process because defendants who are not morally culpable for
their acts are nevertheless held legally culpable?
2.

Does Utah's statutory scheme violate state due process

by holding insane individuals who do not know the difference between
right and wrong or who are not capable of controlling their conduct
culpable for their conduct?
3.

Does Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 violate federal or state

due process by relieving the State of its burden to prove each
element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt?

- 2

-

4.

Does Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 violate state or federal

due process or equal protection because the distinctions between
insane offenders created by the statutory scheme are arbitrary and
capricious, and result in differential treatment for similarly
situated individuals?
5.

Does the treatment, trial and potential criminal

punishment of an insane individual violate the eighth amendment
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment or Article I#
Section 9 of the Utah constitution?
6.

Does the requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-4 that

an insane individual who intends to attempt to negate the mens rea
subject himself to examination violate either the federal or state
protection against giving evidence against oneself?
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The issues presented in this case are issues of first
impression in this state and involve questions of law.

They are

subject to a de novo review by this Court, applying a correction of
error standard of review.

See generally State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d

774 (Utah 1991).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
State v. Herrera, Case No. 920209
In an Information dated June 9, 1991, the State charged
Mr. Herrera with one count of Criminal Homicide, a first degree
felony, and two counts of Attempted Criminal Homicide, Murder,
second degree felonies.

1.

RH. 007-9.*

Footnote on next page.
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On August 19, 1991, Appellant Herrera filed his "Motion to
Declare Utah Statutory Scheme Unconstitutional."
of this motion is contained in Addendum F.

RH. 26-29. A copy

Appellant Herrera also

filed an Amended Plea which indicated that he was pleading "not
guilty or in the alternative not guilty by reason of insanity"
(RH. 157) and an Affidavit from Dr. Breck Lebegue (RH. 159-61).
Following an evidentiary hearing, the submission of memoranda, and
argument, the trial judge denied the motion.
50-3, 162.
Law.

RH. 85-135, 45-9,

The State prepared Findings of Facts and Conclusions of

RH. 204-21.

See Addendum G.

Following argument as to the appropriateness of the State's
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial judge signed such
Findings and Conclusions on April 3, 1992. RH. 244.

On May 13,

1992, this Court granted Mr. Herrera's petition for interlocutory
review of the trial judge's denial of his "Motion to Declare Utah
Statutory Scheme in Regards to Mentally 111 Offenders
Unconstitutional."

See Addendum A.

Appellant Herrera is incarcerated.
State v. Sweezey, Case No. 920265
In an Information dated November 19, 1991, the State
charged Mikell Sweezey with one count of Attempted Criminal
Homicide, Murder, a second degree felony.2

RS. 7.

On March 5,

1. Citations to the record in State v. Herrera, Case No. 920209,
appear as "RH" throughout this brief. Citations to the record in
State v. Sweezey, Case No. 920265, appear as "RS."
2. The probable cause statement alleges that Appellant walked up to
an individual who was standing outside the Marriott Hotel, shot the
individual and stated "[t]hey wrecked my home so I shot him." RS. 8.

- 4
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1992, Appellant Sweezey filed his "Motion to Declare Utah Statutory
Scheme in Regards to Mentally 111 Offenders Unconstitutional"
(RS. 27-31), "Motion to Declare 77-14-4 Unconstitutional"
(RS. 36-8), "Notice of Intent to Contest an Element of the Offense"
(RS. 32), an "Amended Plea" of not guilty or not guilty by reason of
insanity (RS. 34-6), an affidavit from Dr. Breck Lebegue
(RS. 91-102), and accompanying memorandum (RS. 39-90).
Addendum F for copy of motion.

See

In his motion and memorandum,

Appellant Sweezey raised the same issues raised by Appellant Herrera
regarding the constitutionality of Utah's insanity defense.
In an order dated April 20, 1992, Judge Murphy denied
Appellant's motions.

RS. 217-18. A copy of the ruling is contained

in Addendum G.
On August 4, 1992, this Court granted Appellant Sweezey's
petition for interlocutory review.

See Addendum C.

Appellant Sweezey is incarcerated.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
State v. Herrera# Case No. 920209
Dr. Breck Lebegue, a recognized expert in forensic
psychiatry, performed psychological tests and evaluations on
Defendant/Appellant Tomas Herrera.

RH. 160.

Based on his

evaluations of Mr. Herrera, Dr. Lebegue holds the opinion that
Appellant suffered from mental illness at the time of the offense in
the instant case and "would qualify for an affirmative defense of
insanity as that defense existed in Utah prior to 1983."3

3.

Footnote on next page.
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RH. 160.

At the time of the hearings in the trial court on the
issues raised herein, Dr. Lebegue was "unable to state with
certainty whether Tomas Herrera would qualify for the defense of
insanity as presently defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 (1990
Repl. Vol.)." 4

RH. 160.

Although the State initially argued that Appellant lacked
standing to raise these issues, it ultimately conceded the standing
issue.

RH. 453.5

3. Prior to 1983, Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 provided in
pertinent part:
Mental disease or defect. - (1) In any
prosecution for an offense, it shall be a defense
that the defendant, at the time of the proscribed
conduct, as the result of mental disease or
defect, lacked substantial capacity either to
appreciate the wrongfulness of this conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
4. The current version of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 allows the use
of mental illness as a defense only where that mental illness
negates the requisite mental state. It provides in pertinent part:
Mental Illness - Use as a Defense - Influence of
alcohol or other substance voluntarily consume Definition.
(1) It is a defense to a prosecution
under any statute or ordinance that the
defendant, as a result of mental illness,
lacked the mental state required as an
element of the offense charged. Mental
illness is not otherwise a defense.
5. It should be noted that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law signed by the judge in the Herrera case were created completely
by the State. The State initially argued that Appellant Herrera
lacked standing to raise the issues herein. RH. 286, 351-2. Prior
to the trial judge's ruling from the bench, the State had conceded
that Appellant Herrera had "limited" standing but continued to
maintain that he was precluded from raising certain issues.
RH. 409, 417-18.
The trial judge then ruled on the record, without taking
the matter under advisement, that he would deny Appellant's motions
"for the reasons as are set forth by [the State's attorney], so that
(continued)

- fi

(footnote 5 continued)
this case can be moved along." RH. 429. Defense counsel was under
the impression that the motions were denied based on a lack of
standing. RH. 277, 453. The State then prepared seventeen pages of
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which had not been
articulated by the Court. RH. 204-21. The standing issue did not
appear in the Findings and Conclusions. These "Findings" addressed
the merits of the argument, with the only limitation on standing
being that Appellant did not have standing to challenge the
manslaughter or guilty and mentally ill statutes. RH. 215. The
trial judge had never mentioned these specific limitations.
During the protracted argument over the propriety of the
Findings and Conclusions, the State indicated that Defendant had
standing to raise the issues herein. RH. 453. Defense counsel
traced the history of the preparation of the Findings and
Conclusions, pointing out the confusion which had arisen because the
State created Findings and Conclusions which had not been made by
the judge. RH. 453-6.
As appellate courts in this state give greater weight to
the findings of trial judges, it is becoming increasingly more
important to distinguish between findings which were actually made
by the judge and those which were determined by counsel for the
winning side.
Justice Zimmerman's concurring opinion in Automatic Control
Prods. Corp. v. Tel-Tech, Inc.y 780 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1989), which is
cited with approval by this Court in the unanimous State v.
Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990), indicates that
the trial courts must articulate the bases for their rulings, and
that they must closely scrutinize findings drafted by counsel.
Automatic Control at 1263-4. The opinion further indicates that
reviewing courts pay counsel-drafted findings less deference than
those drafted by judges. Id. In Automatic Control Prods. Corp.,
Justice Zimmerman stated:
The findings of fact "is an important part
of the judicial function,11 one that is designed
to flesh out the rationale for the decision and
one that "the judge cannot surrender . . . to
counsel." As the United States Supreme Court has
noted, findings of fact prepared by the court are
"drawn with the insight of a disinterested mind"
and are "more helpful to the appellate court"
than those prepared by counsel. It is for this
reason that the federal courts appear to have
almost uniformly adopted the rule that while
findings prepared by counsel are sufficient under
the federal analogue to Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 52, appellate courts "will feel freer
in close cases to disregard a finding or remand
for further findings if the trial court did not
prepare them him [or her] self."
(continued)

- 7

-

Dr. Lebegue also testified the most common diagnosis for
mentally ill offenders is schizophrenia, a psychotic illness wherein
the individual suffers from delusions.

RH. 310-11, 313. He

delineated the two categories of such offenders and indicated that
the majority of mentally ill offenders, although compelled to kill
by a delusional system and seriously mentally ill, do not qualify
for an insanity defense under Utah's current statute.

RH. 313-18.

His testimony was similar to the information in his affidavit filed

(footnote 5 continued)
I know that I apply a similar standard in
reviewing findings prepared by counsel, and I
suspect that other members of the Court do the
same, although to my knowledge, we have never
said so. In light of this fact and the rule
stated above, trial courts would be well advised
to be vigilant in guarding against the tendency
to view findings as a detail to be dealt with as
expeditiously as possible, rather than as a
fundamental part of the decisional process, one
that goes to the heart of its integrity. In the
same vein, counsel preparing proposed findings
and conclusions should be cautious lest in their
zeal, they inc[l]ude proposals that may undermine
the integrity of the judgment they hope to obtain.
Id. at 1263-1264 (citations omitted). See also United States v.
El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
Although the issues before this Court involve questions of
law which should be reviewed de novo for correctness, to the extent
that any factual issues arise during this Court's review, Appellant
Herrera respectfully requests that this Court not give deference to
any relevant findings.
For instance, the State's drafted finding that the
"affidavit of Reuben Martinez" contains "merely common
generalizations of a lay witness" and that the Court "gives no
credence to them" is irrelevant since the State conceded standing.
RH. 238. In addition, it arguably conflicts with this Court's
decision in State v. Melleny 583 P.2d 46 (Utah 1978), which
recognizes that testimony of lay witnesses is admissible in certain
circumstances to establish insanity. Should this finding assume
importance, this Court should not give it deference, despite the
trial judge's later affirmation of this finding.
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in the Sweezey case.

That information is set forth more fully in

the Sweezey section of this fact statement.

A copy of the affidavit

prepared by Dr. Lebegue in each case is contained in Addendum H.
State v. Sweezey, Case No. 920265
Dr. Breck Lebegue also performed psychological tests and
evaluations on Appellant Mikell Sweezey.

Dr. Lebegue prepared an

affidavit which was submitted in the trial court and is contained in
Addendum H.
In his affidavit, Dr. Lebegue provided information similar
to his testimony in Herrera.

He indicated that the majority of the

offenders he has evaluated have been diagnosed as paranoid
schizophrenics who suffered from delusions.
offenders fall into two categories:

RS. 92. The delusional

(1) those whose delusions cause

them to commit the act and who know they are harming a person,
"although the delusions distort the actual people involved, or the
real situation" (RS. 92); and (2) those whose delusions cause them
to commit the act but who "have the delusional belief they are
harming or killing something that is not human" (RS. 92).
Dr. Lebegue further indicated:
Neither group of offenders is more mentally ill
than the other; both groups are equally in need
of treatment; the delusions seem equally real for
both groups of offenders; each group has the same
inability to comprehend the wrongfulness of their
acts; each group is equally unable to control
their behavior; the threat of punishment will
deter neither group from acting in accordance
with their delusions.
RS. 93.

"Under current Utah law, only the second category of

mentally ill offenders [those that did not know they were harming
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something human] qualifies for a defense of insanity, even though
the only difference between the two groups is the content of their
delusions which are caused by their mental illness."

RS. 93.

Mikell Sweezey suffered from mental illness at the time of
the act, and "there are legitimate issues as to defendant's sanity
at the time of the commission of the offense."

RS. 94. While

Mikell Sweezey would qualify for an insanity defense under the
pre-1983 law, he does not qualify for such a defense under the
current law.

RS. 94.

The State conceded that Mikell Sweezey had standing to
raise the issues addressed herein.

RS. 357-8, 375.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Federal due process requires that a defense of mental
nonresponsibility be available to persons who, as the result of
mental illness, do not understand the wrongfulness of their
actions.

Such a defense was firmly entrenched in English common law

at the time the federal constitution was adopted and has been
allowed, and continues to be allowed, by a majority of the states.
Fundamental fairness requires that persons who, because of mental
illness, are unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of their acts not
be held criminally culpable.

Utah's statutory scheme does not allow

such an insanity defense and allows mental illness to be used as a
defense only in rare cases where the mental illness negates the
intent requirement.

Insanity and mens rea are distinct concepts,

and the removal of a defense of insanity violates federal due
process.
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State due process mandates an insanity defense which, at
the very least, requires that persons who are unable to appreciate
the wrongfulness of their actions or to control their conduct due to
mental illness not be held criminally culpable.

Throughout Utah's

history as a territory and state (until the 1983 statutory change),
there has been heightened awareness of the need for humane treatment
of mentally ill persons and broad application of an insanity defense
for conduct which would otherwise be criminal.

Prior to the

adoption of the Utah constitution, M'Naghten's rule and something
similar to the "irresistible impulse" test were being followed in
Utah.

Following statehood, this state clearly adopted such a

combination test.
This broad test for insanity was followed until 1973 when
the even broader A.L.I. Model Penal Code test was adopted.

A review

of this state's history, case law from this state interpreting the
due process clause of the state constitution, and case law from
other jurisdictions demonstrates that the Utah constitution requires
such a defense.
Assuming, arguendo, that due process does not mandate an
insanity defense as set forth in Points I and II, Utah's statutory
scheme nevertheless violates federal and state due process by
relieving the state of its burden to prove each element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Utah's statutory scheme is arbitrary and capricious, in
violation of state and federal due process and equal protection in
that it treats mentally ill offenders who suffer from the same type
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and severity of mental illness based on the content of their
delusions.

Although such persons are not able to appreciate the

wrongfulness of their conduct, Utah law makes an arbitrary
distinction based on the form and nature of the delusion.
Utah's statutory scheme violates state and federal
proscriptions against cruel and unusual punishment in that it finds
persons criminally culpable and punishes such persons despite the
inability of such mentally ill persons to appreciate the
wrongfulness of their conduct.
Assuming, arguendo, that Utah's statutory scheme is not
otherwise unconstitutional, the requirement that an individual who
desires to attempt to negate the mens rea requirement by asserting a
defense of insanity make himself available for evaluation violates
state and federal protections against being required to give
evidence against oneself.

Where a defendant can only use mental

state to negate an element, such a requirement is unconstitutional.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. UTAH'S STATUTORY SCHEME VIOLATES
FEDERAL DUE PROCESS.
A. THE ELIMINATION OF AN INDEPENDENT DEFENSE OF
INSANITY IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 VIOLATES
FEDERAL DUE PROCESS.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 (1991 Repl. Vol.) provides in
pertinent part:
(1) It is a defense to a prosecution under any
statute or ordinance that the defendant, as the
result of mental illness, lacked the mental state
required as an element of the offense charged.
Mental illness is not otherwise a defense.
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Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305, a criminal defendant
can rely on evidence of mental illness to negate the mens rea
requirement.

A criminal defendant cannot, however, rely on insanity

as a basis for nonresponsibility for the crime unless he suffers
from a form of insanity which serves to negate the mens rea element
of the crime.

Since a criminal defendant always has the opportunity

to negate the mens rea element of a crime and the State is required
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of a crime, the
current version of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 does not provide a
criminal defendant with an affirmative insanity defense.

Instead,

the statute codifies the due process requirement that the State
prove all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt in the
mental illness context.

See generally In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,

364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).

Hence, in Utah, the

traditional affirmative defense of insanity has been abolished.6

6. Prior to 1983, Utah always provided a mental nonresponsibility
defense which absolved a defendant of culpability. The definition
of insanity has evolved and become broader over time as scientific
knowledge has progressed. The most recent formulation in Utah prior
to 1983 provided a defense of mental nonresponsibility to a criminal
defendant who did not have a substantial capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law. See footnote 3, supra, at 6.
The significant difference between the pre-1983 and
post-1983 versions of the statute is apparent from the following
example. A criminal defendant who kills another person because he
believes he is squeezing a grapefruit qualifies for the defense
under either version. Under the current version, such a defense, if
believed, would negate the mens rea; under the pre-1983 version,
such a defendant would be unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of
his conduct.
A criminal defendant who kills another individual because
he suffers delusions and believes that he is in a war, and that
person is the enemy, does not qualify under the current version of
(continued)
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Utah, Idaho and Montana are the only states which have
abolished the affirmative defense of insanity and, instead, allow a
mentally ill defendant to be absolved of culpability only where he
can negate the mental state.7

In a strongly worded analysis, the

American Bar Association (ABA) has condemned the "mens rea
limitation" statutes which have been enacted in Utah, Idaho and
Montana.

A.B.A. Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards, Part VI,

Nonresponsibility for Crime at 336-8.
This approach, which would permit evidence of
mental condition bearing on the requisite mental
or culpability element of the crime but eliminate
mental nonresponsibility [insanity] as an
independent, exculpatory doctrine, was considered
for a time by Congress and was adopted in Idaho,
Montana, and Utah. The ABA has rejected it out
of hand. Such a jarring reversal of hundreds of
years of moral and legal history would constitute
an unfortunate and unwarranted overreaction to
the problems typified by the Hinckley verdict.8

(footnote 6 continued)
the statute. Such a person would have the requisite mens rea since
he knew he was killing a person, and knew the consequence of his
actions. Such a criminal defendant would, however, qualify under
the pre-1983 version since he could not appreciate the wrongfulness
of his conduct.
7. Of these three states, the Utah statute is the most
restrictive. Both Montana and Idaho provide the accused protection
during the sentencing phase. See Montana Code § 46-14-311; Idaho
Code § 19-2523. By contrast, although Utah's statutory scheme
provides for hospitalization of certain mentally ill offenders who
are still mentally ill at the time of sentencing, it does not
require the sentencing judge to inquire into whether the defendant
could "appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct" or "conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law at the time of the offense
charged." See Montana Code § 46-14-311.
8. A jury found John Hinckley not guilty by
an attempted assassination of then President
"resulted in a new round of controversy over
the M'Naghten experience." ABA Standards at
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reason of insanity for
Reagan. The verdict
the defense rivaling
324.

Id. at 336-7 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
The issue presented in this part is whether a defense of
mental nonresponsibility which absolves an insane defendant of
culpability where he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of
his actions is fundamental to notions of fairness, decency and
justice so as to be incorporated in the concept of federal due
process.
In determining whether a particular concept or practice is
protected by federal due process, courts look to whether the
practice is
consistent with the fundamental principles of
liberty and justice which lie at the base of all
our civil and political institutions and not
infrequently are designated as "law of the land."
State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 927 (Idaho 1990) (McDevitt, J.,
dissenting), citing Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316-7, 47
S. Ct. 103, 104, 71 L.Ed. 270 (1926).

Those aspects of the Bill of

Rights which are applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment due process clause are rights that "have been found to be
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" so that a "fair and
enlightened system of justice would be impossible without them."
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-5, 58 S. Ct. 149, 151-2, 82
L.Ed.2d 288 (1937).
Due process has also been described as "principle[s] of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as
to be ranked as fundamental."

Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,

105, 54 S. Ct. 330, 332, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934).

See also Duncan v.

Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 1447, 20 L.Ed.2d 491

(1968) (due process protects rights which are "fundamental to the
American scheme of justice); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401,
413-4, 65 S. Ct. 781, 787, 89 L.Ed. 1029 (1945) (concepts of due
process arises from a historical perspective, reflect "a demand for
civilized standard of law," and reflect notions of fairness, justice
and decency).
The United States Supreme Court has never directly
addressed the issue of whether federal due process requires that a
defense of insanity, other than the ability to negate the mens rea
requirement, exist.
In Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S. Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed.
1302 (1952), the Court rejected the defendant's claim that Oregon's
"adoption of the 'right and wrong' test of legal insanity in
preference to the 'irresistible impulse' test" violated due process.
The Leland Court pointed out that although the science of psychiatry
had evolved since M'Naghten's case, "the progress of science has not
reached a point where its learning would compel us to require the
states to eliminate the right and wrong test [in favor of the
irresistible impulse test]."

The Court concluded that given the

current state of the science of psychiatry, the historical
perspective, and the fact that the majority of states followed a
right and wrong test, the "irresistible impulse test is not
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'"

Id. at 801.

Implicit, however, in the Leland majority decision is the notion
that insane defendants are not culpable for their conduct.

See also

Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. at 802-07 (Justice Frankfurter, joined by

Justice Black, dissenting) (analysis in dissent based on assumption
that insane persons are not criminally culpable).
In State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 923 (McDevitt, J.,
dissenting), Justice McDevitt pointed out that he did "not believe
that the holding in Leiand leads to the conclusion that the insanity
defense is not contained within the concept of due process."
Searcy, 798 P.2d at 923.
Thus, the Leland decision is properly read to
hold that no one test of insanity has been proven
so scientifically reliable as to amount to a
constitutional prohibition of the use of any
other test by the mandates of due process.
Instead, the Supreme Court in Leland recognizes
that the science of psychiatry is not yet so
accurate that it has the capacity to formulate a
standard that will accurately quantify mental
responsibility in all individual cases.
Id.
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 20 L.Ed.2d 1254, 88 S. Ct. 2145
(1968), also did not clarify whether an insanity defense is
constitutionally mandated.

In reaching its decision that punishing

chronic alcoholics for being drunk in a public place was not cruel
and unusual, the plurality opinion stated:
We cannot cast aside the centuries-long evolution
of the collection of interlocking and overlapping
concepts which the common law has utilized to
assess the moral accountability of an individual
for his antisocial deeds. The doctrines of
actus reus, mens rea, insanity, mistake,
justification, and duress have historically
provided the tools for a constantly shifting
adjustment of the tension between the evolving
aims of the criminal law and changing religious,
moral, philosophical and medical views of the
nature of man. The process of adjustment has
always been thought to be province of the States.
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Powell, 392 U.S. at 353.
The decision in Powell evidenced a reluctance to "adopt one
magic phrase to encompass all issues of moral accountability" and a
recognition that the concepts of actus reus, mens rea, insanity,
mistake, justification, and duress have changed and evolved over the
years.

Searcy, 798 P.2d at 926. Although the precise definitions

change, the idea that these concepts are part of due process has
not.

The dissent in State v. Searcy pointed out:
. . . I cannot accept the majority's reading of
[Powell v. Texas] as an implicit rejection of the
insanity defense as a doctrine rooted in the
constitution. Indeed, the Supreme Court's
enumeration of the insanity defense in the
cherished and distinguished company of the
doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, mistake,
justification, and duress lends force to the
argument that insanity is on equal par with those
concepts within the constitution. Although
Powell leaves the process of the adjustment of
the tension between those concepts to the states,
it certainly does not imply that the states may
constitutionally abolish each, or any, of those
doctrines without running afoul of the
constitution.

Id. at 926.
Although the Court has not directly addressed the issue,
two United States Supreme Court cases suggest that a criminal
defendant must be "blameworthy" in order to be held criminally
responsible.

See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S. Ct.

8417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 78
S. Ct. 240, 2 L.Ed.2d 228 (1957).
Three older decisions from state supreme courts indicate
that a separate defense of insanity is constitutionally mandated.
See State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 102 (1970); Sinclair v.
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State, 161 Miss. 142, 132 So.2d 581 (1931); State v. Lanqef 168 La.
958, 123 So. 639 (1929).
In Sinclair v. State, the court explicitly referred to the
type of insanity not covered by the current Utah statute and
concluded that disallowing a defense where an individual suffers
from such a type of insanity would be unconstitutional.
A monomaniac may kill a man under the insane
delusion that the man is an enemy who is about to
kill him. Here there is an intent, as the
monomaniac clearly understands that the act will
result in the victim's death; but there is a lack
of animus, because he believes that he is
justified, and that the act, therefore, is right
in the sight of the law. It is clear, then, that
where the mind of the perpetrator is so diseased
as to exclude the presence of an intent or animus
in the commission of the crime in question, he
should not be punished as criminal. So closely
has the idea of insanity as a defense to crime
been woven into the criminal jurisprudence of
English speaking countries that it has become
part of the fundamental laws thereof, to the
extent that a statute which attempts to deprive a
defendant of the right to plead it will be
unconstitutional and void.
Sinclair, 132 So. at 584.
In State v. Strasburg, the court reasoned that a defendant
who was deprived of his opportunity to show that he was insane and
did not understand the nature and quality of his acts was deprived
of his right to due process and a trial by jury in the same way as
if he were precluded from showing that he did not commit the act.
In its analysis, the court made no distinction between persons
suffering from mental illness which negated mens rea and those
suffering from insanity who nevertheless possessed the requisite
mens rea.
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We believe enough has been said to show that the
sanity of the accused at the time of committing
the act charged against him has always been
regarded as much as substantive fact, going to
make up his guilt, as the fact of his physical
commission of the act.
110 P. at 1022.

See also State v. Lanqe, 123 So. 639.

In State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992 (Mont. 1984), the court
attempted to distinguish Sinclair, Strasburg and Lanqe by stating:
These decisions are distinguishable in that they
interpret statutes that precluded any trial
testimony of mental condition, including that
which would cast doubt on the defendant's state
of mind at the time he committed the charged
offense. The Montana statutes in question
expressly allow evidence of mental disease or
defect to be introduced to rebut proof of
defendant's state of mind.
Korell, 690 P.2d at 1000.
The distinction made by the Montana court is not persuasive
in reviewing the Utah statute since the Utah statute does preclude
evidence of a defendant's state of mind at the time of the offense.
For example, the Utah statute would preclude evidence that, as the
result of delusions, the defendant thought he was shooting the enemy
during a war.

This example was expressly articulated by the

Sinclair court in its analysis of why the statute at issue was
unconstitutional.
In Korell and State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914 (Idaho 1990),
the defendants attacked the Idaho and Montana statutes which allow a
defendant to present evidence of insanity only to the extent that it
negates mens rea.

Although the decisions in those cases upholding

the Idaho and Montana statutes are not controlling in this state, it
should also be noted that those decisions fail to recognize that a

- 20 -

form of insanity exists which affects mental state at the time of
the crime but which does not negate intent, e.g.,

the situation

where an individual knows that he is killing a human being but does
so under a delusion that the person is a war enemy.

Instead, both

Searcy and Korell blur the distinction between insanity and intent,
recognizing only that form of insanity which negates the intent to
do the crime.
The decision in Searcy has been criticized by at least one
commentator for its failure "to articulate the relationship between
mens rea and mental illness" and its failure to address the
decisions in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, and Fisher v.
United States, 328 U.S. 463.

See Recent Developments, Due Process—

Insanity Defense—Idaho Supreme Court Upholds Abolition of Insanity
Defense Against State and Federal Constitutional Challenges, 104
Harv. L. R. 1132 (1991).
In Patterson v. New York, the Court upheld a
New York statute requiring that defendants prove
the affirmative defense of extreme emotional
disturbance by a preponderance of the evidence.
According to the Court, this defense constituted
"a separate issue" from the requisite element of
mens rea. As a result, Patterson allows states
to distinguish issues of mental illness from
determinations of mens rea, suggesting that the
former does not necessarily have any bearing on
the latter. Furthermore, in Fisher v. United
States, the Court upheld a trial court's refusal
to instruct the jury to consider evidence of
mental illness offered by the defendant to rebut
the requisite mens rea for first-degree murder.
The Court found that this refusal to instruct was
a "matter peculiarly of local concern" lacking
constitutional dimension. Patterson and Fisher
therefore leave states free to erect procedural
barriers that prevent defendants from
establishing any relationship between mens rea
and mental illness. Yet an interpretation of
mens rea that excluded all issues of mental
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illness would have the same effect as the three
abolition statutes invalidated earlier this
century as violations of due process. The Searcy
court's distinction between the early type of
abolition, which explicitly rejected the
significance of psychiatric evidence, and the
recent type of abolition, which reaches the same
result under a narrow approach to mens rea, would
thus appear overly formalistic.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
The decision in Korell is similarly flawed in that it fails
to address relationship between mens rea and mental illness, and
fails to recognize that evidence of mental illness affecting mental
state at the time of the crime might be considered irrelevant as to
mens rea.

As the dissent in Searcy pointed out, lack of mens rea

and insanity are separate doctrines which are treated as one by the
majority in both Searcy and Korell.
Because Searcy and Korell misinterpret Powell and Leiand
and fail to consider the forms of insanity which affect mental state
at the time of the crime, but do not negate intent to do the crime,
they are not well reasoned and should not be embraced by this Court.
In determining whether a practice is fundamental to
fairness and justice and therefore protected by due process, courts
look to the legal and moral history of the practice.

See Leland,

343 U.S. at 798; Searcy, 798 P.2d at 928. The history of the
insanity defense demonstrates that a defense of mental
nonresponsibility is a fundamental aspect of criminal justice.
"jurisprudential underpinnings" of the mental nonresponsibility
(insanity) defense "reach back to origins of Western ethical and
legal thought."

ABA Standards at 324.
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The

As early as the sixth century B.C., commentary on
the Hebrew scriptures distinguished between
harmful acts traceable to fault and those that
occur without fault. To these ancient scholars,
the paradigm of the latter type of act was one
committed by a child, who was seen as incapable
of weighing the moral implications of personal
behavior, even when willful; retarded and insane
persons were likened to children. See Piatt &
Diamond, The Origins and Development of the "Wild
Beast11 Concept of Mental Illness and Its Relation
to Theories of Criminal Responsibility, 1 J.
Hist. Behav. Sci. 355, 366 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as Piatt & Diamond]. The Greek moral
philosophers, at least as far back as fifth
century B.C., considered the distinction between
a culpable and nonculpable act to be among the
"unwritten laws of nature supported by the
universal moral sense of mankind." B. Jones, The
Law and Legal Theory of the Greeks 264 (1956).
The same view pervaded Roman law and appeared in
the teaching of early Christian theologians. It
emerged in Anglo-Saxon law no later than the
twelfth century, the result of the "mutual
influences and interaction of Christian theology
and Anglo-Saxon law." Levitt, The Origin of the
Doctrine of Mens Rea, 17 111. L. Rev. 117, 136
(1922). The idea was reinforced in England after
the Norman invasion brought with it continental
legal thought, itself strongly influenced by
Christian ethics and canon law, which had already
absorbed Jewish ethical teachings, classical
philosophy, and Roman law. See Piatt & Diamond,
supra, at 356.
ABA Standards at 324 n.8.
At the time the framers adopted the United States
constitution, a defense of mental nonresponsibility was firmly
entrenched in the English common law.

See extensive discussion of

common law evolution of insanity defense in Appellants7 memoranda
filed in the trial court at RH. 92-95, RS. 47-9; see also Searcy,
798 P.2d at 929; Quen, Psychiatry and the Law; Historical Relevance
Today in By Reason of Insanity;

Essays on Psychiatry and the Law,

143, 154-7 (1987).

- 23 -

Early American case law "followed the development of the
English cases and commentators in the rare instances that insanity
was pleaded as a defense to crimes up until the holding in
M'Naghten's case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843)."
931.

Searcy, 798 P.2d at

See, e.g., In Re Clark, 1 City Hall Recorder (N.Y.) 176

(1816); In Re Ball, 2 City Hall Recorder (N.Y.) 85 (1817).
In 1843, the verdict in M'Naghten's case created public
outcry and resulted in a set of rules which provided the basis for
American court decisions on the insanity defense.

Daniel M'Naghten

was a Scottish woodcutter who assassinated Edward Drumond, believing
him to be the Prime Minister.

Because of M'Naghten's delusions, he

believed the Prime Minister to be responsible for repeated personal
misfortunes that M'Naghten suffered.

Evidence of M'Naghten's mental

illness was convincing, and he was acquitted.9
At the request of the House of Lords, the English justices
issued what came to be known as the M#Naghten standard:
[I]t must be clearly proved that, at the time of
committing the act, the party accused was
labouring under such defect of reason, from
disease of the mind, as not to know the nature
and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did
know it that he did not know he was doing what
was wrong.
Searcy, 798 P.2d at 931.

9. The type of insanity suffered by M'Naghten would not have
relieved him of culpability under Utah's current statute even though
he was insane and his insanity impacted directly on his mental state
at the time of the homicide. Nevertheless, M'Naghten knew he was
killing a person and therefore would presumably have been unable to
negate intent under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305.
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The majority of American states adopted some form of the
M'Naghten test.

ABA Standards at 332. 10

In addition, the majority of states as well as the federal
system continue to recognize an affirmative defense of insanity.
See discussion supra at 14.
Although the fact that the insanity defense has been
universally accepted throughout this nation's history does not
require a determination that the insanity defense is
constitutionally mandated, it is an important factor to be
considered in analyzing whether such a defense is "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" or fundamental to our system of
jurisprudence.

See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. at 798.

The existence and acceptance of the defense at the time the
framers adopted the constitution, the roots of the defense in
Judeo-Christian notions of morality, and the pervasiveness of the
defense throughout this nation's history and at the current time
demonstrate that the defense is "so rooted in traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked fundamental."

Leland, 343

U.S. at 798 (quoting Snyder v. Mass., 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
As Justice McDevitt stated in his dissent in Searcy;
The underlying theme of these various
formulations of "due process" is a sense of

10.

The ABA Standards at 332 point out:
By the turn of the century, about one-third of
the states had nonresponsibility tests consisting
of M'Naghten and the irresistible impulse rule;
one state, New Hampshire, had the product rule;
and the rest adhered to the M'Naghten test
alone. This state of affairs remained
"essentially unchanged" until the 1950s.
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historical precedent upon which American
institutions were founded and our continuing
legal traditions. Thus, the proper focus in
evaluating the place of a particular doctrine in
the concept of due process is the pervasiveness
of the doctrine in the history of the common
law, A review of the extensive history of the
insanity defense in the law of England and the
United States leads to the conclusion that due
process does require the availability of that
defense to criminal defendants.
State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d at 928.
Because an affirmative defense of insanity is so
fundamental to our system of justice, it is incorporated in the
concept of due process as guaranteed by the United States
constitution.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305, which eliminates an

affirmative defense of insanity, is therefore unconstitutional.11
B. THE GUILTY AND MENTALLY ILL STATUTE DOES NOT
MAKE UP FOR THE LACK OF A TRADITIONAL INSANITY
DEFENSE.
In determining whether Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 is
unconstitutional, this Court must look to Utah's entire statutory

11. Although evolving scientific knowledge and the need for a
continuing application of any doctrine embraced by this Court
counsel against formulation of a precise definition of insanity (see
Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. at 798; State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d at
923), a review of the history of the insanity defense mandates that,
at the very least, the M'Naghten standard is part of federal due
process. That standard would allow a defendant to show that he did
not know the nature and quality of his act or did not know that his
act was wrong. Although the M'Naghten case did not occur until
after the federal constitution was adopted, the notion that persons
who, due to mental illness, did not know the nature and quality of
their acts were not criminally responsible was in place when the
constitution was adopted. See generally Searcy, 798 P.2d at 929.
The M'Naghten standard has been used by a majority of the states,
and remains in effect in most states. While scientific knowledge
has since evolved to allow broader, more liberal definitions of
insanity, at the very least, an insanity defense of this nature is
mandated by federal due process.
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scheme regarding the treatment of mentally ill offenders.

See

Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. at 793 ("to determine the merit [of a
fourteen amendment due process] challenge, the statute must be
viewed in its relation to other relevant Oregon law . . . " ) .
In State v. Sweezey, Judge Murphy ruled, based on "the
presumption of constitutionality that attaches to legislative
enactments,"
that although the right of the defendant to
present a "traditional" insanity defense may rise
to the level of a fundamental right, UCA 76-2-305
offends neither the United States nor the Utah
constitutions as long as it is read in
conjunction with UCA 77-16a-2, which provides for
a verdict of guilty and mentally ill.
RS. 217.
A review of the guilty and mentally ill ("GAMI") scheme
demonstrates that the existence of such an alternative verdict does
not compensate for the missing insanity defense.

Pursuant to Utah

Code Ann. § 77-16a-101 et. seq., when a defendant either pleads
"guilty and mentally ill" or is found "guilty and mentally ill" by
the trier of fact, the trial court conducts "a hearing to determine
the defendant's present mental state."

Utah Code Ann.

§ 77-16-a-104(4) .
Hence, according to the GAMI scheme, a defendant who was
insane at the time of the incident and killed another believing the
decedent to be an attacking Viet Cong, but at the time of sentencing
has been medicated and is no longer suffering from delusions, would
be treated like any other convicted defendant despite the GAMI
statutes.
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In State v. DePlonty, 749 P.2d 621, 627 (Utah 1987), the
Court recognized that "a defendant can be found mentally ill even
though his mental illness does not entirely negate the mens rea of
the crime charged."

It also recognized that a determination that

one is guilty and mentally ill does not necessarily result in
hospitalization.
(Utah 1988).

Id.; see also State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266

The trial judge must hold a hearing to determine not

only whether the defendant is currently mentally ill, but also
whether hospitalization is the appropriate disposition.
Code Ann. § 77-16a-104.

See Utah

Hence, an individual who kills another

while suffering insane delusions that the other person is an
attacking Viet Cong and who continues to suffer delusions may
nevertheless be sentenced to the prison either because the trial
judge determines that hospitalization is not the appropriate
disposition or because the trial judge determines that the person is
not currently mentally ill.
Furthermore, even if the trial judge hospitalizes the
mentally ill individual, the mental health of that individual is
reviewed at least every six months, and he can be transferred to the
prison if he is found to no longer be mentally ill or to have
received "maximum benefit."12

Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-203.

12. This "soft," undefined maximum benefit standard results in
arbitrary and capricious decisions, in violation of due process.
See generally State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1272.
The "infirmities of the guilty and mentally ill scheme after
hospitalization have not yet been explored by this Court. To the
extent that this Court might consider relying on the GAMI statutes
as being an cidequate substitute for the missing affirmative insanity
(continued)

- 28 -

The fundamental notion at the base of the traditional
insanity defense is that an insane person is not criminally
responsible for his actions.

The GAMI statutes do not protect this

fundamental notion because mentally nonresponsible persons are
nevertheless convicted and held criminally culpable; the only relief
offered by GAMI statutes is that in some cases where the individual
continues to be mentally illf he will be housed at the state
hospital rather than the prison.13

(footnote 12 continued)
defense, it should be aware that the lack of definition of "maximum
benefit" leads to arbitrary and capricious treatment of mentally ill
offenders. In addition, an equal protection challenge based on the
disparate treatment of mentally ill offenders exists. See ABA
Standards at 393-4.
13. The American Bar Association "disapproves of any type of
guilty-but-mentally-ill (GBMI) verdict. This policy, adopted by the
ABA House of Delegates in 1983, is also supported by the American
Psychiatric Association, the National Mental Health Association
Commission on the Insanity Defense, and virtually all commentators
who have analyzed the subject." ABA Standards at 391 (footnotes
omitted). The ABA Standards pointed out that
the GBMI verdict is deficient for an important
theoretical reason: It is not a proper verdict
at all. Rather, it is a dispositional mechanism
transferred to the guilt determination phase of
the criminal process. The hybrid nature of the
verdict is demonstrated by the fact that a jury
determination of mental illness at the time of a
charged offense is relevant not to criminal
responsibility or culpability but to whether
accused persons might receive treatment after
they have been sentenced, a finding best made and
acted upon after trial when information about
various dispositional alternatives can be
obtained and qualified experts consulted. Even
if the GBMI verdict accurately identified
offenders needing psychiatric treatment, which it
apparently fails to do, it would not be a
particularly useful innovation because virtually
(continued)
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The GAMI scheme is not a substitute for an insanity defense
because (1) persons who were insane at the time of the crime can be
found criminally culpable, (2) not all persons who were insane at
the time of the crime will qualify as GAMI at the time of
sentencing, (3) not all persons who are GAMI at the time of
sentencing are actually sent to the hospital under the GAMI scheme,
(4) those persons who are sent to the hospital can be transferred to
the prison as soon as six months after sentencing, and (5) the GAMI
statutes themselves suffer from constitutional infirmities.
Utah's abolition of a separate defense of insanity violates
federal due process.
POINT II. UTAH'S STATUTORY SCHEME DENIES
DEFENDANTS DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER THE STATE
CONSTITUTION.

(footnote 13 continued)
every state already provides for the
hospitalization of prisoners requiring inpatient
care.
If the goal is to reduce acquittals by
reason of mental nonresponsibility [insanity],
attention should be deflected to the proper scope
of the nonresponsibility defense. If it is
instituted to prevent permature release of
persons found nonresponsible, criteria for
committing and releasing them should be
reexamined. If, instead, the concern is the
proper treatment of mentally ill or mentally
retarded offenders, sentencing and prison
transfer provisions should be evaluated. The
guilty-but-mentally-ill verdict fails to address
any of these problems adequately. Instead, it
adds a confusing and conceptually unjustifiable
element to the criminal justice system.
Id. at 393-4.
The repeated, significant amendments of the Utah GAMI
statutes suggest that the purpose and effect of such statutes are
unclear and fail to protect mentally ill offenders or otherwise
compensate for the missing insanity defense.
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Article I, Section 7 of the Utah constitution provides that
"[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law."

That provision was adopted as part of the

original Utah constitution in 1897 and has remained in effect
throughout Utah's statehood.
Although the language of Article I, Section 7 is identical
to that of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States constitution, this Court has recognized that
Article I, Section 7 provides greater due process protection in some
contexts than does its federal counterpart.

See State v. Ramirez#

817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991) (greater scrutiny given to eyewitness
identification testimony under state due process than under federal
due process); Foote v. Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991)
(inmate has right to state due process at Board of Pardons hearing
even though no federal due process right exists at such hearings).
In addition, this Court has relied on Article I, Section 7
of the Utah constitution to protect mentally ill offenders.

See

State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1272 (Utah 1988) (finding
application of two subsections of Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-21.5, the
guilty and mentally ill statute, to mentally ill offenders arbitrary
and capricious, in violation of state due process).
The history of the insanity defense in Utah demonstrates
that such a defense is a fundamental aspect of ordered liberty in
this state and that the concept has not only existed, but has also
been broadly defined.

The affirmative defense of insanity has been

recognized throughout Utah's history as a territory and state.

The

defense was firmly entrenched at the time the Utah constitution was
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adopted in 1897, based on a recognition of the need for humane
treatment of mentally ill persons and an acceptance of a moral and
philosophical view that insane persons are not criminally culpable
for their conduct.
The recognition of the need for humane treatment of
mentally ill persons is evident from the fact that Salt Lake City
was the site of the first institution for mentally ill in the
western United States.

McKell, unpublished Master's thesis, History

of the Utah State Hospital, University of Utah Library Archives.
Twenty-four years prior to passage of the state constitution,
territorial governor George C. Woods spoke of the need for the
territorial government to address the problems of the mentally ill:
We now number about one hundred thousand souls
with a steady and rapid increase from every
quarter. We ought to have an asylum for the
insane. Humanity requires it. There is no
public institution where these poor unfortunates
can be kept. I should fail to do my duty were I
to omit to urge you to take such steps
immediately as will meet this great public want.
Message of Governors 1850-1876.

Bound Volume, Utah Historical

Society, Salt Lake City, Utah, pp. 159-160.
The laws of the territory provided for humane treatment of
the mentally ill.
Every person guilty of any unnecessarily harsh,
cruel or unkind treatment of, or any neglect of
duty towards, any idiot, lunatic or insane person
is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Laws of Utah, 1876, Ch. XI Sec. 193.
The criminal nonresponsibility of insane individuals was
also statutorily recognized prior to statehood when Utah was a
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territory.

Title I, Chapter 1852, Section 22 of the compiled laws

of the Territory of Utah identified those individuals legally
capable of committing crimes.

Section 22 explicitly recognized that

insane persons are not criminally culpable:
All persons are capable of committing crimes
except those belonging to the following classes:
First—children under the age of seven
Second—children between the ages of seven
and fourteen years in the absence of clear
proof that at the time of committing the act
charged against them they knew of its
wrongfulness
Third—Idiots
Fourth—Lunatics and insane people

Compiled laws of 1876 (emphasis added).
text of law.

See Addendum E for complete

The statutory scheme recognizing that insane persons

are not criminally culpable was maintained throughout the time
predating statehood and was retained following statehood and
adoption of our state constitution.

See Compiled Laws of Utah

§ 4387 (1888); revised statutes of the State of Utah § 4071 (1898).14
Utah territorial case law recognized that insane persons
were not criminally culpable.

In 1888, nine years before the

adoption of the Utah constitution, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
The test of responsibility for a criminal act,
when unsoundness of mind is set up as a defense,
is the capacity of the defendant to distinguish
between right and wrong at the time of and with

14. The language of this territorial law was retained, with only
changes in numbering, through 1973. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-41
(1953), a copy of which is contained in Addendum E. In 1973, the
Legislature repealed § 76-1-41 and enacted § 76-2-305, which adopted
the A.L.I, definition. See footnote 3. See Addendum E for text of
former insanity defense statutes. The A.L.I, definition remained in
effect until the current statute was adopted in 1983.
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respect to the act which is the subject of the
inquiry. The law presumes that the mind is in
its normal condition until some evidence of
unsoundness or imbecility appears. We understand
that the capacity of a person accused of crime to
determine whether the criminal act was right or
wrong is the correct test of responsibility. If
a man, with ability to refuse, kills another with
the knowledge that it is wrong, he is responsible
to the law for the act.
Territory v. Catton, 16 P. 902, 908-9 (Utah 1888).

This formulation

of the defense embraces the M'Naghten rule but also appears to
encompass th€> future "irresistible impulse test" by focusing on the
defendant's "ability to refuse."
In People v. Dillon, 3 P. 150 (Utah 1892), the majority
affirmed the defendant's conviction of manslaughter.

In his

dissent, Justice Blackburn stated:
The law cannot impose an obligation upon an
insane person, for he is incapable of assuming
obligations. He is not capable of acting in a
legal sense; he is mentally incapable of making a
defense; he is without mind; he cannot
reason • • • •
Justice Blackburn concluded:
I am therefore convinced that a man should not be
convicted of a crime where there is well founded
doubt of his sanity at the time of its
commission; that it is the law, and ought to be;
and that it is founded in reason and humanity,
and consistent with a Christian civilization.
This view of the law is supported by many
authorities . . . The reasoning in these cases is
so forcible and in accordance with the well
recognized principles of criminal pleading and
evidence that no other is needed.
Id. 30 P. at 154 (emphasis added).
Hence, an insanity defense which relieved insane persons of
criminal responsibility was in existence, defined and a fundamental
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aspect of the criminal justice system when the Utah constitution was
adopted.
Following statehood, the mental nonresponsibility defense
continued as a fundamental principle of Utah law.
Brown, 102 P. 641 (Utah 1909).

See State v.

In Brown, the Utah Supreme Court

reiterated that "[a]n insane person cannot legally be guilty of a
criminal intent."

Id. at 645.

The Court recognized that an

individual could have the requisite mens rea to commit a crime but
nevertheless not be criminally culpable due to insanity.
But if we assume that defendant intended to forge
the checks, which he no doubt did, this is not
alone sufficient to make an insane person guilty
of a crime . . . . 1 5
"Ordinarily insane persons comprehend the nature
of their acts. When they take a life or destroy
property they usually know what they are doing,
and often choose means singularly fitted to
accomplish the end in view." The true test is
whether the defendant, at the time of the
commission of the offense, had the mental
capacity to know that in doing the act he was
doing wrong . . . "And where an individual lacks
the mental capacity to distinguish right from
wrong, in reference to this particular act
complained of, the law will not hold him
responsible."
Id. at 645 (citations omitted).
In conclusion, the Court compared the conviction of an
innocent man who is sane to the conviction of an individual who is
mentally nonresponsible and indicated that the latter was a greater
wrong.

15. This would be sufficient to make an insane person guilty under
the current statute since the defendant would have the requisite
mens rea.
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To convict a sane man who is innocent is
deplorable, but to sentence an insane man to the
penitentiary for a crime that he did not have the
mental capacity to commit would be intolerable.
To concede that the law is impotent, and the
courts powerless to avoid such a result, is a
concession that we are not prepared to make.
Id. at 646. 16
In State v. Green, 6 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1931), the Utah
Supreme Court recognized that mental nonresponsibility is a complete
defense requiring acquittal where a defendant did not know the
nature of his act and that the act was wrong or was unable to
control his actions due to mental disease or defect.

This

combination of the M'Naghten and "irresistible impulse" tests as the
test for mental nonresponsibility was utilized in Utah until modern
times.

See, e.g., State v. Poulson, 381 P.2d 93 (Utah 1963)

(ratifying combination of M'Naghten and "irresistible impulse" tests
as mental nonresponsibility test in Utah); State v. Dominquez, 564
P.2d 768, 770 (Utah 1977) (upholding insanity instruction "based
primarily on a combination of the M'Naghten rule and "irresistible
impulse" tests); State v. Sessions, 645 P.2d 643, 645 (Utah 1982)
(noting that 1973 statutory change broadened "the insanity test to
conform to current accepted principles of moral responsibility" and
distinguishing between insanity and diminished capacity).
Until 1983, when the current version of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-2-305 was adopted, Utah has had a mental nonresponsibility

16. Although the Brown court considered sentencing "an insane man
to the penitentiary for a crime he did not have the mental capacity
to commit" to be "intolerable" and worse than convicting an innocent
man, the current version of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 permits such a
result.
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defense available for mentally ill offenders which "is one of the
most liberal that can be found in the country."

State v. Kirkham,

319 P.2d 859, 861 (Utah 1958) (referring to instruction approved in
Green). 17
The concept of mental nonresponsibility is found throughout
Utah statutory and case law prior to 1983.

See Addendum E for text

of statutes; State v. Mewhinneyy 134 P. 632 (Utah 1913) (applying
knowledge of right and wrong test for insanity); State v. Baer, 638
P.2d 517 (Utah 1981) (concluding that lack of substantial evidence
of insanity made insanity instruction unnecessary and implicitly
recognizing distinction between negating mens rea and defense of
insanity); State v. Mellen, 583 P.2d 46 (Utah 1978) (recognizing
that in appropriate circumstances, testimony of lay witnesses as to
defendant's insanity is admissible); State v. Sessions, 645 P.2d
643, 645 (Utah 1982) (noting that 1973 statutory changes broadened
"the insanity test to conform to current accepted principles of
moral responsibility" and distinguishing between insanity and
diminished capacity); State v. Anselmof 148 P. 1071, 1074 (Utah
1915) (distinguishing between evidence of insanity as a complete
defense and evidence of mental impairment which impacts on ability
to deliberate and premeditate); State v. Kirkhamf 319 P.2d at 861
(pointing out that Utah provides one of broadest or most liberal

17. In 1973, Utah "abandoned the M'Naghten and irresistible impulse
test" and adopted the broader and more liberal A.L.I. Model Penal
Code standard. Sessions, 645 P.2d at 645. See footnote 3 for text
of the predecessor to the current statute.
This former statute, based on the A.L.I. Model Penal Code,
was even broader than the statute referred to in Kirkham since it
required only that an individual lack "substantial capacity."
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insanity defenses).

As the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly

recognized, in 1909 and at other times, insane individuals could not
be convicted of crimes even though their acts may have been
deliberate.

Seey e.g., State v. Brown, 102 P. at 645.

Case law from this Court following the enactment of the
current version of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 continues to evidence a
concern for fair and humane treatment of mentally ill offenders.
See State v. Copelandf 765 P.2d 1266; State v. DePlontyf 749 P.2d
621.

Throughout its history as a territory and state, Utah has

shown a fundamental concern for humane treatment of mentally ill
offenders and, up until 1983, a recognition that persons who are
mentally nonresponsible cannot be criminally culpable.

In addition,

until the adoption of the current statute, Utah has been in tune
with the evolving science of psychiatry and has employed some of the
most progressive standards in defining mental nonresponsibility.
Case law from other jurisdictions also supports a
determination by this Court that a complete defense of mental
nonresponsibility is required as a fundamental aspect of state due
process under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah constitution.

As

previously outlined, three states have relied on their state and/or
federal due process provisions in concluding that statutes which
outlawed an affirmative insanity defense were unconstitutional.

See

State v. Strasburqf 110 P. 102; Sinclair v. State, 132 So.2d 581;
State v. Lange, 123 So. 639.

See discussion, supra, at 18-20.

In addition, in State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d at 921, two of
the five justices of the Idaho Supreme Court dissented from the

- 38 -

majority opinion, determining that abolition of the insanity defense
violated state as well as federal due process.
921 (Johnson, J., concurring and dissenting).

Searcy, 798 P.2d at
Justice Johnson,

joined by Justice McDevitt, discussed the state due process
violation:
The insanity defense was well established in the
territory of Idaho at the time of the Idaho
Constitutional Conventions and continued to be
part of our jurisprudence until the Legislature
purported to abolish it in 1982. It has been
part of the process that was due defendants in
criminal cases for virtually the entire existence
of our Idaho legal system. It is fundamental to
our jurisprudence and is protected by the due
process clause of art. I, § 13.
Searcy, 798 P.2d at 722 (Johnson, J., concurring and dissenting,
joined by McDevitt, J.).
This Court should follow the lead of the three older
decisions, and the dissent in Searcy, and conclude that a defense of
mental nonresponsibility which, at the very least, is based on a
combination of the M'Naghten rule and irresistible impulse tests is
constitutionally protected in this state.18
The territorial constitution of the Territory of Deseret,
article 8, section 8, recognized that

lf

[a]ll penalties and

punishments shall be in proportion to the offense."

That same

18. Although a precise definition of insanity is not warranted in
light of the evolving nature of the science, at the very least, a
minimum threshold standard based on a combination of the M'Naghten
and irresistible impulse rules is required in this state. M'Naghten
was being followed when the Utah constitution was adopted, and
language suggesting an irresistible impulse test appears in
pre-statehood case law. See Catton, 16 P. at 908-9. In addition,
this combination test was firmly established in Utah law shortly
after the constitution was adopted. See Green, 6 P.2d at 184.
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fundamental principle is stated in a slightly different context in
the introductory provision of our current criminal code which
mandates that persons "without fault" not be condemned as
criminals.

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-104 (1953 as amended).

The historical concern for mentally ill persons, the
existence and fundamental acceptance of the insanity defense at the
time the Utah constitution was adopted, the pervasiveness of the
defense and its broad or progressive application throughout Utah's
existence, and case law from other jurisdictions support Appellant's
position that the right to a mental nonresponsibility defense where
one is unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or
control his actions is a fundamental aspect of state due process.
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court find Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-2-305 unconstitutional, in violation of Article I, Section 7 of
the Utah constitution.19
POINT III. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 VIOLATES
DUE PROCESS BY RELIEVING THE STATE OF THE BURDEN
OF PROVING EVERY ELEMENT OF THE CRIME BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT.
A.

FEDERAL DUE PROCESS

Due process requires that the State prove every element of
a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S.

197, 206, 97 S. Ct. 2319, 2324, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977).
In Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, the United States
Supreme Court upheld an Oregon statute which required a defendant to

19. The GAMI statutory scheme fails to relieve persons who were
insane when they committed the crime from criminal culpability and
fails to provide hospitalization for all mentally nonresponsible
offenders (see discussion of GAMI statutes, supra, at 26-30).
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establish the affirmative defense of insanity beyond a reasonable
doubt.

In so doing, the Court emphasized that despite this

requirement, the statute required the State to prove mens rea, along
with the other elements, beyond a reasonable doubt.
The current Utah statute removes the traditional mental
nonresponsibility defense and allows an insane defendant to rely on
insanity only where it negates the mens rea.

Even though insanity

can be used only to negate the mens rea, i.e. to disprove an element
of the crime, Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-308 labels insanity as an
"affirmative defense."20

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-502,

defendants must present evidence of an affirmative defense.

This

statutory scheme contrasts markedly with the scheme in Leland v.
Oregon, where the state was required to establish mens rea beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The United States Supreme Court has never directly
addressed the issue of whether it violates federal due process to
place the burden of production or proof of insanity on a defendant
where the defendant can only use his mental illness to negate intent
and no separate defense of insanity exists.

The traditional

presumption of sanity which has existed historically where a
defendant has an affirmative defense of insanity available is of
questionable validity when no such defense exists.

Instead,

requiring the defendant to produce or prove the insanity smacks
against the due process requirement that the State prove all

20.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-308 states:
Defenses enumerated in this part constitute
affirmative defenses.
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elements beyond a reasonable doubt.21
The United States Supreme Court has drawn a sharp line
between situations where the defendant can be required to bear the
burden of proof or production and those where he may not.

See

McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91 L.Ed.2d 67, 106 S. Ct.
2411 (1986); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 61 L.Ed.2d 39, 99
S. Ct. 2450 (1979).
That Court has stated:
Lest there remain any doubt about the
constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt
standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process
Clause protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368
(1970) .
As the dissent pointed out in State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d at
935, "mens rea and insanity are not one and the same."
Under the rules enunciated in those [United
States Supreme Court] cases, if the insanity
defense is no more than an issue of whether the
defendant entertained the necessary mens rea to
commit the crime, then the holding of Leiand must
fall, and the prosecution must bear the burden of
proving the sanity of every defendant.
Id.

21. This tension emphasizes the weaknesses in the current Utah
formulation of the insanity defense. While a presumption of sanity
and the placement of a burden of production or proof on a defendant
can be rationalized where insanity is an affirmative defense, where
it is only a negation of the mens rea, placing any affirmative
burden on the defendant, raises due process concerns. To some
extent, the "presumption of sanity" becomes a "presumption of
intent" where the only intent issue revolves around the defendant's
sanity.
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Defendants in Utah who attempt to negate the mens rea by
r

asserting insanity are required to present evidence.

The

presumption of sanity in the context of Utah/s current statute
creates a presumption of intent which violates due process.
B.

STATE DUE PROCESS

As previously outlined supra at 31, the due process clause
of the Utah constitution provides greater protection than its
federal counterpart in some contexts.

See State v. Ramirez, 817

P.2d 774; Foote v. Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734; State v.
Copeland, 765 P.2d 1272. The history of this state suggests that
the fair and humane treatment of mentally ill offenders is of
fundamental importance.

See discussion, supra, at 30-8.

Given the pervasive concern for fair treatment of mentally
ill offenders in this state, and the due process requirement that
the State prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt, the Utah
statutory scheme which allows a defendant to use insanity only to
negate the mens rea element, and then requires the defendant to go
forward with evidence, violates Article I, Section 7 of the Utah
constitution.

See discussion of federal violation, supra, at 40-3.

POINT IV. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 IS ARBITRARY
AND CAPRICIOUS IN VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
A.

STATE CONSTITUTION

Article I, Section 7 of the Utah constitution protects
against arbitrary and capricious laws.

See State v. Copeland, 765

P.2d at 1272. This Court has recognized that Article I, Section 7
protects mentally ill offenders from arbitrary and capricious
legislation which regulates whether they are to be afforded
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treatment.

Id.; see also discussion supra at 30-8 regarding broader

protections under state due process.

Just as the application of two

sections of the former guilty and mentally ill statute to mentally
ill offenders was arbitrary and capricious, the distinction made in
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 between offenders with the same severity
of mental illness is arbitrary and capricious, in violation of
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah constitution.
Article I, Section 24 of the Utah constitution provides,
"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation."

The

section and the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause "embody
the same general principle:

persons similarly situated should be

treated similarly, and persons in different circumstances should not
be treated as if their circumstances were the same."

Greenwood v.

City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816 (Utah 1991), quoting Malan v.
Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 1984) (footnotes omitted).
Nonetheless, "The different language of Article I, § 24, the
different constitutional contexts of the two provisions, and
different jurisprudential considerations may lead to a different
result in applying equal protection principles under Article I, § 24
than might be reached under federal law."

Id.

Utah's strong, consistent history of treating mentally ill
offenders in a humane and progressive fashion (see discussion supra
at 30-9) suggests that disparate treatment of mentally ill offenders
who suffer from the same type and severity of mental illness would
violate Article I, Section 24 of the Utah constitution.
Dr. Breck Lebegue, an experienced forensic psychiatrist,
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testified that although not all persons who assault or murder others
are mentally ill, of those that are mentally ill, "the most common
diagnosis is one of psychosis; that is, a complete loss of reality,
inability to think clearly and to relate to reality."

RH. 310-11.

Those with psychotic illness usually suffer from schizophrenia, "and
the nature of that psychotic illness is a fixed false belief system"
or delusion.

RH. 313. Most persons who kill as a result of a fixed

false belief or delusional system do not fit within Utah's current
statutory definition of insanity.

RH. 313.

Such persons are

compelled to kill by their delusional system but, nevertheless, do
not fit within Utah's definition of insanity because they intend to
cause the death of another.

RH. 314, 317.

Despite the existence of mental illness in a number of
defendants, Dr. Lebegue thought (without checking his records) that
he had found only one individual to be insane under Utah's current
statutory definition since 1983.

RH. 312. The one person who did

qualify for an insanity defense under Utah's current law was a young
male with a diagnosis of schizophrenia who experienced auditory
hallucinations.

RH. 314. As the result of commands given in the

auditory hallucinations and in the context of a paranoid and
delusional system, the man used a sword and attempted to kill what
he thought was the devil but which was, in fact, his roommate.
RH. 315.
Dr. Lebegue defined two groups of mentally ill offenders
who differ only in whether they know that they are hurting or
killing a person.

The larger group intends to kill a person while

the smaller group does not, and thinks they are hurting the devil, a
lemon, a robot, or some other non-person.

RH. 317. While the

groups differ as to the item being hurt, the severity of their
mental illness and the biochemical changes in the brain which cause
the schizophrenia would be the same.

RH. 317-18.

The only

difference would be the content of the delusional belief.

RH. 318.

Persons in both groups are unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of
their conduct.

RH. 318; see also affidavits of Breck Lebegue

contained in Addendum H.
Utah law does not discriminate between the guilty and not
guilty defendant on the basis of his ability to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his actions, his ability to control his actions or
the severity of his mental illness.

Instead, Utah law discriminates

based on the form or nature of his delusional system.

To determine

guilt on such a senseless standard is unreasonable, arbitrary and
inhumane, in violation of Article I, Sections 7 and 24 of the Utah
constitution.
B.

FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

The fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution
also prohibits arbitrary and capricious legislation.

See generally

Nebba v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1933); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539 (1974).

In addition, the fourteenth amendment equal protection

clause protects against disparate treatment of persons similarly
situated.

See generally McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 85

S. Ct. 283, 13 L.Ed.2d 222 (1964).

"Whether a statute meets equal

protection standards depends upon the objectives of the statute and

whether the classifications established provide a reasonable basis
for promoting those classifications."

Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d at

670.
For the reasons outlined in subsection (a) above, Utah Code
Ann. § 76-2-305 results in unreasonable classifications and
arbitrary and capricious determinations of guilt, in violation of
the fourteenth amendment due process and equal protection clauses.
POINT V. UTAH'S STATUTORY SCHEME REGARDING
MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS VIOLATES THE STATE AND
FEDERAL PROSCRIPTIONS AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT.
A.

FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

The eighth amendments cruel and unusual punishment
provision originated in the English Bill of Rights of 1689.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 158, 169 (1976).

See

Its purpose in our

constitution is to prohibit "infliction of uncivilized and inhuman
punishments."
concurring).

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 268 (Brennan, J.,
As a general rule, no punishment can be imposed in the

absence of culpability or blame.

See Sinclair v. State, 132 So.

581, 585-86 (Miss. 1931) (Ethridge, J.) (it is cruel and unusual
punishment to convict a person of murder and impose a life sentence
when he was insane and incapable of understanding the nature and
quality of the act at the time the act was committed);

Robinson v.

California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (it is cruel and unusual
punishment to punish one of his status as a drug addict);22

22.

In dicta, the Robinson court stated:
It is unlikely that any State at this moment
would attempt to make it a criminal offense for a
(continued)
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Powell v, Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (it is not cruel and unusual to
punish defendant for his actions of being drunk in public; defendant
not being punished for his status of being an alcoholic); State v.
Strasburq, 110 P. 1020, 1022 (Wash. 1910) (insane person cannot be
legally punished for acts committed by him while insane); State v.
Brown, 36 Utah 46, 102 P. 641, 645 (1909) (law cannot hold someone
responsible who lacks mental capacity to distinguish between right
and wrong).
In Sinclair, Justice Ethridge23 of the Supreme Court of
Mississippi concluded that to punish an insane person for a criminal
act would be cruel and unusual and a violation of both the
Mississippi and United States constitutions.

Justice Ethridge

repeated the common law concept that it is "shocking and inhuman to
punish a person for an act when he does not have the capacity to
know the act or judge its consequences."

Sinclair, 132 So. at 584.

The Utah Supreme Court has also restricted punishments for
insane persons.

See, e.g., State v. Brown, 102 P. at 646

(footnote 22 continued)
person to be mentally ill, or a leper, or to be
afflicted with venereal disease . . . [A] law
which made a criminal offense of such a disease
would doubtless be universally thought to be an
infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments.
Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666.
23. The Supreme Court of Mississippi wrote a short per curiam
decision holding that legislative attempts to abolish presentation
of an insanity defense were unconstitutional in violation of
Mississippi's due process clause. Justice Ethridge's opinion is a
concurring opinion joined by Justices McGowen and Cook in which they
address the cruel and unusual punishment issue.
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(indicating that punishing an insane person for a crime is
deplorable).
Utah's current statutory scheme, which allows punishment of
mentally ill offenders who could not appreciate the wrongfulness of
their conduct, violates the eighth amendment.
B.

STATE CONSTITUTION

Article I, Section 9 of the Utah constitution prohibits
excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishment.
It also declares that

fl

[p]ersons arrested or imprisoned shall not be

treated with unnecessary rigor."

Id.

The United States

constitution contains no similar provision.

At least three other

state constitutions contain an unnecessary rigor provision:
Wyoming,24 Indiana25 and Tennessee.26
The other states with an unnecessary rigor provision
generally apply it to abuses which occur during pretrial
incarceration.

See Suter v. State, 227 Ind. 648, 88 N.E.2d 386

(1949) (unnecessary rigor provision applies to any place where

24. Article I, Section 16 of the Wyoming constitution states that
"No person arrested and confined in jail shall be treated with
unnecessary rigor. The erection of safe and comfortable prisons,
and inspection of prisons, and the humane treatment of prisoners
shall be provided for." The Wyoming constitution includes a
separate provision to address cruel and unusual punishments.
Wyoming Const, art. I, § 14.
25. The Indiana constitution protects persons arrested and confined
in jail: "No person arrested, or confined in jail, shall be treated
with unnecessary rigor." Indiana Const, art. I, § 15. Indiana's
Article I, Section 16 addresses cruel and unusual punishments.
26. Tennessee provides "That no person arrested and confined in
jail shall be treated with unnecessary rigor." Tennessee Const,
art. I, sec. 13. Tennessee's Article I, Section 14 addresses cruel
and unusual punishment.
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arresting officer may confine a defendant and also applies to period
of determination prior to filing of charges and issuance and service
of warrant); Saunders v, State, 216 Tenn. 425, 392 S.W.2d 916 (1965).
Of the four states with unnecessary rigor provisions, only
Utah's provision appears in the same section as the cruel and
unusual punishment section.

The constitution's drafters, by

including unnecessary rigor and cruel and unusual punishment in the
same section, presumably intended that they be interpreted as part
of the cruel and unusual punishment proscription, and not as a
separate provision regulating jail conditions.

The unique

development of Utah constitutional law supports this theory.
The inclusion of the unnecessary rigor provision in Utah's
constitution is probably in some part a result of the early Mormon
persecutions of the 1830's.

See L. Arrington & D. Bitton, The

Mormon Experience, 76-77 (1979).27

The arrest and murder by

vigilantes of Joseph and Hyrum Smith in 1844 had profound effect on
the remaining church members and initiated the Mormon exodus to
Utah.

Id.
The Mormons' persecution continued in Utah.

The territory

made six unsuccessful bids for statehood between 1849 and 1887.
R. Poll and T. Alexander, Utah's Historyf 243.

The primary obstacle

27. Joseph Smith was a self-taught constitutional scholar and spent
countless hours teaching constitutional principles to church
subordinates. His students later became ecclesiastical and
political leciders that undoubtedly made significant contributions in
drafting Utah's numerous constitutions. See Wallentine, Heeding the
Call Search and Seizure Jurisprudence Under the Utah Constitution,
article I, section 14, 17 Utah J. Contemp. L. 13 and n.57 (1991).
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to statehood was the Mormons' practice of polygamy.

Id.

Many of

the Mormon leaders who moved from Nauvoo to Utah were tried and
jailed for violations of the Morrill Act of 186228 and Edmunds Act
of 1882.29
wretched.

The conditions of incarceration were described as
Wallentine, supra, at 17.

It was not uncommon for judges

to jail women with small children and place several prisoners in one
cell.

Id.
When Utah finally achieved statehood in the late 1890's,

the drafters of the Utah constitution considered deleting the
unnecessary rigor language in Article I, Section 9.

Those who

criticized the provision pointed out that no other state had that
language in its constitution.

See Official Report of the

Proceedings and Debates of the Convention to Adopt a Constitution
for the State of Utahf 267-68 b(1898).

After returning from

committee, the provision was retained.

Its inclusion is a strong

indication that the drafters felt a need for protections greater
than those found in the federal constitution.

Indeed, the history

of Mormon persecution from the 1830's until 1896 provides ample
evidence that the constitutional drafters were well aware of
improper treatment of accused persons, and were committed to
insuring that it did not happen in Utah.
As discussed supra at 13, current Utah statutes preclude

28. The Morrill Act of 1862 prohibited plural marriages,
disincorporated the Mormon church, and restricted church ownership
of property to $50,000. Utah's History, 244.
29. The Edmunds Act declared polygamy a felony and defined
polygamous living or unlawful cohabitation as a misdemeanor.
History, 259.
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Utah's

an insanity defense except in the rarest of cases where insanity
negates mens rea.

Mentally ill offenders who were unable to

appreciate the wrongfulness of the act are nevertheless criminally
culpable and subject to incarceration if they had the requisite
intent.
Simultaneously with the elimination of the insanity
defense, the Legislature created the option of guilty and mentally
ill.
As set forth supra at 26-30, the guilty and mentally ill
statutes do not compensate for the missing insanity defense.
Persons who were mentally nonresponsible for the crime nevertheless
are incarcerated in most cases.

Such defendants can be incarcerated

at any of the following stages:

(1) although mentally

nonresponsible at the time of the crime, they no longer suffer from
mental illness requiring hospitalization at the time of sentencing,
(2) although insane at the time of the crime and still mentally ill
at sentencing, the trial judge determines they cannot be treated or,
for other reasons, should be sentenced to prison, or (3) insane at
the time of the crime and mentally ill at the time of sentencing, it
is determined shortly after they arrive at the hospital that they
have received "maximum benefit" and they are transferred to the
prison.

Under each of these scenarios, persons who are mentally

nonresponsible are incarcerated and held criminally culpable.
Dr. Lebegue testified that mentally ill criminal defendants
who suffer from schizophrenia require life-long management of
symptoms through therapy and medication.
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A transfer to the prison

while still mentally ill ignores this treatment goal.

The maximum

benefit standard suggests that mentally ill offenders can be "cured"
by participating in maximum treatment, a conclusion Dr. Lebegue
specifically rejected.

RH. 320-1.

Imposing criminal responsibility on an offender who is
unable to conform his conduct or appreciate wrongfulness constitutes
"unnecessary rigor."

In addition, Utah's treatment of mentally ill

offenders, whereby they are usually committed to the Utah State
Prison, is unnecessary rigor in violation of Article I, Section 9 of
the Utah constitution.
POINT VI. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-14-4 VIOLATES A
DEFENDANT'S STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-4 (Supp. 1991) provides:
(1) When the court receives notice that a
defendant intends to claim that he is not guilty
by reason of insanity or that he had diminished
mental capacity, the court shall order the
Department of Human Services to examine the
defendant and investigate his mental condition.
(2) The defendant shall make himself available
and fully cooperate in the examination by the
department and any other independent examiners
for the defense and the prosecuting attorney. If
the defendant fails to make himself available and
fully cooperate, and that failure is established
to the satisfaction of the court at a hearing
prior to trial, the defendant is barred from
presenting expert testimony relating to his
defense of mental illness at the trial of the
case.
A.

FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

The fifth amendment to the United States constitution
provides that

fl

[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal
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case to be a witness against himself . . . ." The protections of
the fifth amendment apply outside of the courtroom, Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) , and to court-ordered psychiatric
evaluations.

Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 1866, 68

L.Ed.2d 359 (1981).
There is a split of authority regarding whether the filing
of a notice of an intent to rely on a traditional affirmative
defense of insanity constitutes a waiver of the fifth amendment
privilege.

The question has provided a variety of opinions as well

as scholarly debate.
Examination?

Danforth, Death Knell for Pre-Trial Mental

Privilege Against Self-incrimination, 19 Rutgers L.

Rev. 489 (1965); Note, Reguiring a Criminal Defendant to Submit to a
Government Psychiatric Examination;

An Invasion of the Privilege

Against Self-incrimination, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 648 (1970).
Many courts have ruled that a defendant who raises an
insanity defense cannot be compelled to give evidence against
himself.
A person accused of a crime who enters a plea of
not guilty by reason of insanity, cannot be
compelled to carry on conversations against his
will under the penalty of forfeiture of the
defense for failure to respond to questions, or
for a refusal to "cooperate" with persons
appointed to examine him. The statute which
prescribes the procedures to be followed upon the
entry of a plea of not guilty by reason of
insanity cannot operate to destroy the
constitutional safeguards against selfincrimination .
French v. District Court Division 9, 384 P.2d 268, 270 (Colo.
1963).

Accord Commonwealth v. Pomponi, 284 A.2d 708 (Penn. 1971);

United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036 (3rd Cir. 1975); Shepard v.

Bowe, 442 P.2d 238 (Or. 1968).

Other courts have rejected that position and held that the
assertion of an "insanity defense" waives the constitutional
privilege.

They have only allowed a court-ordered examination,

however, when the defendant has asserted the affirmative defense of
insanity, and when there is a statutory or court-imposed ban on use
of the evidence gathered in the guilt phase of the trial. See,
e.g., State ex. rel Sikorav Dist. Ct. of 13th Jud. Dist., 462 P.2d
897, 899 (Mont. 1968).
Where a defendant is required to be examined and waive the
privilege against self-incrimination, statutes limiting the
introduction of the evidence to rebut insanity and precluding use of
the evidence during the guilt phase often exist.

The federal

provision, 18 U.S.C. 4244, is typical.
No statement made by the accused in the course of
any examination into his sanity or mental
competency provided for by this section whether
the examination shall be with or without the
consent of the accused, shall be admitted in
evidence against the accused on the issue of
guilt in any criminal proceeding.
In Utah, no such statutory limitation exists.

In addition,

in Utah, a defendant can use insanity only to negate the mens rea;
no distinct defense of mental nonresponsibility exists.

Hence, in

Utah, a defendant is required to be examined in order to put on
evidence to negate an element.

Where a defendant can only put on

evidence of insanity to negate an element, the examination
requirement conflicts with due process and the right against
self-incrimination.
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In State v. Volser, 345 N.W.2d 806 (Neb. 1984), the Supreme
Court of Nebraska considered whether a defendant that did not raise
an insanity defense, but had called mental health experts in the
process of contesting the elements of the offense, could be forced
to undergo an evaluation by the state's experts.

The court held:

While . . . a court may have the inherent power
to order a psychiatric examination of a defendant
who places his sanity in issue, such is not the
case when a defendant is only attempting to rebut
the existence of the intent element of a crime
with which he is charged. When one pleads
insanity and offers evidence on that issue, such
a plea carries with it an implicit, although not
legally operative, admission of the State's
charges. Such a plea necessarily carries with it
the assertion that the commission of the actf
along with the intent, was the result of the
defendant's inability to understand the nature
and quality of the act or distinguish right from
wrong.
On the other hand, a person who introduces
evidence of his mental condition to rebut the
presumption that the act he performed was coupled
with the requisite intent makes no admission of
the crime. Such evidence is offered to show only
that the crime charged was not committed. It
carries with it no concession of the State's case
and does not interject an issue foreign to the
State's burden of proof. Throughout the
proceedings, the State is contending that the
defendant committed the crime, and the defendant
is contending he did not. In such a situation the
fifth amendment requires that the State prove its
case without compelling the defendant to submit
to interview by those in its employ. [citations
omitted]
Id. at 813 (emphasis added).
The same result was reached in United States v. Alvarez,
519 F.2d 1036 (3rd Cir. 1975), wherein the court stated:
Some courts have said, either expressly or
implicitly, that a court may compel a defendant
to submit to a psychiatric examination for the

_ R£ _

purpose of determining his sanity at the time of
the offense, and that the prosecution may use the
psychiatrist's testimony at the trial. A
considerable literature questioning and
criticizing the propriety of this kind of
procedure has developed. This circuit is
committed to the position that use at trial of
statements exacted by the compulsion where a
court ordered psychiatric examination, at least
where any statement elicited in the examination
tends to establish the fact of the offense or the
voluntariness of other statements by the accused,
is a violation of the privilege against self
incrimination. United States ex rel. Smith v.
Yeaqerf 451 F.2d 164 (3rd Cir.), aff'q. 336
F.Supp. 1287, 1305 (D.N.J. 1971). See also
Commonwealth v. Pomponi/ 284 A.2d 708 (Penn.
1971).
Although the defendant in each of these cases has filed a
notice of intent to contest the mens rea element of the offense, the
insanity defense in Utah provides no other basis for
nonresponsibility.

Requiring a defendant to give evidence against

himself in order to defend against the elements of the crime
violates his rights as guaranteed by the fifth amendment to the
United States constitution.
B.

STATE CONSTITUTION

The fifth amendment to the United States constitution
provides in part that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself."

Article I, Section 12 of the

Utah constitution provides that "the accused shall not be compelled
to give evidence against himself."

The distinct language coupled

with this state's history and policy considerations demonstrate that
Article I, Section 12 provides greater protection to the individual
than its federal counterpart.

- 57 -

In American Fork v. Crosqrove, 701 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1985),
this Court analyzed Article I, Section 12, holding that it applied
only "to those situations where the state seeks evidence of a
testimonial or communicative nature."

Id. at 1075.

Under this

standard, the right of the individual not to reveal his thoughts in
the face of accusations by the State—the most fundamental right
sought to be protected by the privilege against self-incrimination—
remains inviolate.

See Id.

The Crosqrove majority also cited to the common law history
of the constitutional privilege.
It is widely acknowledged that the common-law
privilege against self-incrimination was aimed
directly at the inquisitorial system of the
English ecclesiastical courts, traces of which
began to creep into the civil-law system at an
early date. Under this system, the accused could
be required to take an oath to answer truthfully
all questions directed to him. Thus, he was
placed in the "cruel trilemma" of having to
answer truthfully (which, depending on how
skillfully the questions were framed, could
incriminate him even if he were innocent of the
offense), commit perjury, or remain silent and be
found in contempt of court.
Crosqrovef 701 P.2d at 1073 (citations omitted).
The type of inquisitorial procedure condemned in Crosqrove
was used against Mormon polygamists during the federal raids.
Entire families were put into jail if they refused to "cooperate"
with the federal marshalls.

Bradley, Hide and Seek:

Children on

the Underground, 51 Utah Hist. Q. 133, 142 (1983); Ex Parte Harris,
5 P. 129 (Utah 1884).

The drafters of our constitution were no

doubt sensitive to the need to protect against government
overreaching.

- 58 -

With a history so rich in government-sanctioned persecution
and intimidation, any protection against government interference
must have been of critical importance to the drafters of our state
constitution.

Since these rights and protections were so important

to the drafters of our constitution, Article I, Section 12 must be
construed so as to disallow a procedure where the defendant is
forced to "cooperate" with an agency of the state in order to
present a defense which negates an element.
The rationale in State v. Volser# 345 N.W.2d 806, that a
defendant cannot be compelled to submit to an examination should be
followed.

See also French v. Dist. Ct., 384 P.2d 268; Comm. v.

Pomponi# 284 A.2d 708; United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036.
Given the unique Utah historical perspective, this Court
should find the inquisitorial procedures of § 77-14-4 violative of
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah constitution.
CONCLUSION
Appellants Herrera and Sweezey respectfully request that
this Court reverse the trial judges' orders denying their motions to
"Declare Utah Statutory Scheme Unconstitutional," and remand the
cases for trial.
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ADDENDUM A

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

Regular February Term, 1992

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Tomas R. Herrera,
Defendant and Appellant.

May 13, 1992

No. 920209
911901075FS

Appellant's Petition for Interlocutory Appeal having
been considered, and the Court being sufficiently advised in
the premises, it is ordered that an Interlocutory Appeal
be, and the same is, granted as prayed.

ADDENDUM B

i-fife_e=u
'JUN 21992,
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

£^J&*^ .

ooOoo

<v plarv T Moonan
Cten< or ' t e Court
Uten Court of Appeals

State of Utah,

ORDER OF CERTIFICATION
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No. 920289-CA
v.
MiJcell Sweezey,
Defendant and Petitioner.

Before Judges Orme, Bench, Billings, and Garff.
This matter is before the court on a stipulated petition for
permission to file an interlocutory appeal and motion to certify
this case to the Utah Supreme Court.
Pursuant to Rule 2 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
this court hereby suspends the requirement in Rule 43 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure that requires that a suggestion of
transfer may not be filed prior to the docketing statement. The
petition for interlocutory appeal satisfies the requirement of a
docketing statement under Rule 43. Now, therefore, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that the petition for permission to file an interlocutory
appeal is certified to the U^ah Supreme Court.
day of-May^ 1992.

Dated this

Gregory K. Orme, Judge

Russell W/ Bench, Judge

fczfrS/ft / ;

J u p t h M . B i l l i n g s , JOcl

i
1

SO

44r^

Regnal W. ^Garff /"Jtfdge/
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v

ADDENDUM C

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
- ~ - -oo 0 o o ~ - ~
Regular May Term, 1992

August 4, 1992

State of Utah,
Plaintiff arid Appellee,
v.
Mikell Sweezey,
Defendant and Appellant.

1 1'ci)

920265
921900092FS

MINUTE ENTRY
The motion for interlocutory appeal was inadvertently
den i ed by the

n 3uI
l y 29. 1 992.

"

sua

sponte, having reconsidered its action and being fully advised
in the premises, orders that the interlocutory appeal be, ai id
t he same

11, qranted , »i«? , prayed

The district court, is

directed to transfer the record to this court.
This appeal is hereby consolidated with the similar
appeal

in State

calendaring a

, Herrera No. 920209 for the 'purposes of
argument.

By

T

ni

i onJ r t

ADDENDUM D

TEXT OF STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Amendment XIV to the Const itut inn nl I he (lulled Sfiite,*. pi ovules in
pertinent part:
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Amendmei it V" tc • tl ie Consti tutj 01 i • ::: >f t h e I Jnited States pi: o\ Ides:
No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger; nor shall any person be
subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of ] :i fe, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.
Amendment VIII to the Constitution of the United States provides:
Excessive bail S hall not be required nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.
Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec.

12.

[Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to appear and defend in person and
by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof,
+ * testify in his own behalf ^ * A confronted by

the witnesses against him, to have compulsory
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in
his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by
an impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged to have been
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases.
In no instance shall any accused person, before
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or
fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband
against his wife, nor shall any person be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law.
Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines—Cruel
punishments•]
Excessive bail shall not be required;
excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor shall
cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted.
Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be
treated with unnecessary rigor.
Article I, Section 24 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have
uniform operation.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 provides:
76-2-305. Mental illness—Use as a defense—
Influence of alcohol or other substance
voluntarily consumed—Definition.
(1) It is a defense to a prosecution under
any statute or ordinance that the defendant, as a
result of mental illness, lacked the mental state
required as an element of the offense charged.
Mental illness is not otherwise a defense.

i
The defense defined in this section
includes the defenses known as "insanity" and
"diminished mental capacity."
(3) A person who is under the influence of
voluntarily consumed or injected alcohol,
controlled substances, or volatile substances at
the time of the alleged offense is not excused
from criminal responsibility on the basis of
mental illness.
(4) "Mental illness" means a mental disease
or defect that substantially impairs a person/s
mental, emotional, or behavioral functioning. A
mental defect may be a congenital condition, the
result of injury, or a residual effect of a
physical or mental disease and includes, but
not limited to, mental retardation. Mental
illness does not mean a personality or character
disorder or abnormality manifested only by
repeated criminal conduct.
(5) "Mental retardation" means a
significant subaverage general intellectual
functioning, existing concurrently with deficits
adaptive behavior, and manifested during the
developmental period as defined by the current
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American
Psychiatric Association.
Utah Code Ann. §77-14-4 provides:
1 7 • 1 4 I Mental examination or defendant.
(1) 'When the court receives notice that a
defendant intends to claim that he is not guilty
by reason of insanity or that he had diminished
mental capacity, the court shall order the
Department of Human Services to examine the
defendant and investigate his mental condition.
The person or organization directed by the
department to conduct the examination shall
testify at the request of the court or either
party in any proceeding in which the testimony is
otherwise admissible. Pending trial, unless the
court or the executive director directs
otherwise, the defendant shall be retained in the
same custody or status he was i n at the time the
examination was ordered.
(2) The defendant shall make himself
available and fully cooperate i n the examination
by the department and any other independent
examiners for the defense and the prosecuting
attorney. If the defendant fails to make himself
available and fully cooperate, and that failure

is established to the satisfaction of the court
at a hearing prior to trial, the defendant is
barred from presenting expert testimony relating
to his defense of mental illness at the trial of
the case. The department shall complete the
examination within 30 days after the court's
order, and shall prepare and provide to the court
prosecutor and defense counsel a written report
concerning the condition of the defendant.
(3) Within ten days after receipt of the
report from the department, but not later than
five days before the trial of the case, or at any
other time the court directs, the prosecuting
attorney shall file and serve upon the defendant
a notice of rebuttal of the defense of mental
illness, which shall contain the names of
witnesses the prosecuting attorney proposes to
call in rebuttal.
(4) The reports of any other independent
examiner are admissible as evidence upon
stipulation of the prosecution and defense.
(5) This section does not prevent any party
from producing any other testimony as to the
mental condition of the defendant. Expert
witnesses who are not appointed by the court are
not entitled to compensation under Subsection (7).
(6) This section does not require the
admission of evidence not otherwise admissible.
(7) Expenses of examination ordered by the
court under this section shall be paid by the
Department of Human Services. Travel expenses
associated with the examination incurred by the
defendant shall be charged by the department to
the county where prosecution is commenced.
Examination of defendants charged with violation
of municipal or county ordinances shall be
charged by the department to the entity
commencing the prosecution.
Utah Code Ann. §77-16a-103 provides:
77-16a-103. Plea of guilty and mentally ill.
(1) Upon a plea of guilty and mentally ill
being tendered by a defendant to any charge, the
court shall hold a hearing within a reasonable
time to determine whether the defendant is
mentally ill.
(2) The court may order the department to
examine the defendant, and may receive the
testimony of any public or private expert witness
offered by the defendant or the prosecutor. The

defendant may be placed in the Utah State
Hospital for that examination only upon approval
by the executive director.
(3)
(a) A defendant who tenders a plea of
guilty and mentally ill shall be examined
first by the trial judge, in compliance with
the standards for taking pleas of guilty.
THe defendant shall be advised that a plea
of guilty and mentally ill is a plea of
guilty and not a contingent plea.
(b) If the defendant is later found
not to be mentally ill, that plea remains a
valid plea of guilty, and the defendant
shall be sentenced as any other offender.
(4) If the court concludes that the
defendant is currently mentally ill his plea
shall be accepted and he shall be sentenced in
accordance with Section 77-16a-104.
(5)
(a) When the offense is a state
offense, expenses of examination,
observation, and treatment for the defendai it
shall be paid for by the department.
(b) Travel expenses shall be paid by
the county where prosecution is commenced.
(c) Expenses of examination for
defendants charged with violation of a
municipal or county ordinance shall be paid
by the municipality or county that commenced
the prosecution

Utah Code Ann. §77-16a-202 provides:
77-16a~202. GuiJ1 \ and menta
LII—Commitment
to department.
(1) In sentencing and committing a mentally
ill offender to the department under Subsection
77-16a-104(3)(a), the court shall:
(a) sentence the offender to a term of
imprisonment and order that he be committed
to the department for care and treatment
until transferred to UDC in accordance with
Sections 77-16a-203 and 77-16a-204; or
(b) sentence the offender to a term of
imprisonment and order that he be committed
to the department for care and treatment for
no more than 18 months, or until he has
reached maximum benefit, whichever occurs
first. At the expiration of that time, the
court may recall the sentence and
commitment, and resentence the offender, A
commitment and retention of jurisdictir

under this subsection shall be committed in
accordance with Subsection (a).
(2) The court may not retain jurisdiction,
under Subsection (l)(b), over the sentence of a
mentally ill offender who has been convicted of a
capital offense. In capital cases, the court
shall make the findings required by this section
after the capital sentencing proceeding mandated
by Section 76-3-207.
(3) When an offender is committed to the
department under Subsection (1)(b), the
department shall provide the court with reports
of the offender's mental health status every six
months. Those reports shall be prepared in
accordance with the requirements of Section
77-16a-203. Additionally, the court may appoint
an independent examiner to assess the mental
health status of the offender.
(4) The period of commitment may not exceed
the maximum sentence imposed by the court. Upon
expiration of that sentence, the administrator of
the facility where the offender is located may
initiate civil proceedings for involuntary
commitment in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter
12 or Title 62A, Chapter 5.
Utah Code Ann. §77-16a-203 provides:
77-16a-203. Review of guilty and mentally ill
persons committed to department—Recommendations
for transfer.
(1) The executive director shall designate
a review team of at least three qualified staff
members, including at least one licensed
psychiatrist, to evaluate the mental condition of
each mentally ill offender committed to it in
accordance with Section 77-16a-202, at least once
every six months. If the offender is mentally
retarded, the review team shall include at least
one individual who is a designated mental
retardation professional, as defined in Section
62A-5-301.
(2) At the conclusion of its evaluation,
the review team described in Subsection (1) shall
make a report to the executive director regarding
the offender's current mental condition, his
progress since commitment, prognosis, and a
recommendation regarding whether the mentally ill
offender should be transferred to UDC or remain
in the custody of the department.

(3) The executive director shall notify the
UDC medical administrator, and the board's
mental health adviser that a mentally ill
offender is eligible for transfer to UDC if
the review team finds that the offender:
(i) is no longer mentally ill; or
(ii) is still mentally ill and
continues to be a danger to himself 01
others, but can be controlled if
adequate care, medication, and
treatment are provided, and that he has
reached maximum benefit from the
programs within the department,
(b) The administrator of the mental health
facility where the offender is located shall
provide the UDC medical administrator with a
copy of the reviewing staff's recommendation
and:
(i) all available clinical facts;
(ii) the diagnosis;
(iii) the course of treatment, received
at the mental health facility;
(iv) the prognosis *or remission of
symptoms;
(v) the potential
i recidivism;
(vi) an estimation of the offender's
dangerousness, either to himself or
others; and
(vii) recommendations for future
treatment.
Utah Code Ann. §77-16a-204 provides:
77-16a-204. Guilty and mentally ill—UDC
acceptance of transfer.
(1) The UDC medical administrator shall
designate a transfer team of at least three
qualified staff members, including at least one
licensed psychiatrist, to evaluate the
recommendation made by the department's review
team pursuant to Section 77-16a-203. If the
offender is mentally retarded, the transfer team
shall include at least one person who has
expertise in testing and diagnosis of mentally
retarded individuals.
(2) The transfer team shall concur in
recommendation if it determines that UDC can
provide the mentally ill offender with the level
of car necessary to maintain his mental condition,
(3) The UDC transfer team and medical
administrator shall recommend the facility in

which the offender should be placed and the
treatment to be provided in order for his mental
condition to remain stabilized to the director of
the Division of Institutional Operations, within
the Department of Corrections.
(4) In the event that the department and
UDC do not agree on the transfer of a mentally
ill offender, the administrator of the mental
health facility where the offender is located
shall notify the mental health adviser for the
board, in writing, of the dispute. The mental
health adviser shall be provided with copies of
all reports and recommendations. The board's
mental health board shall make a recommendation
to the board on the transfer and the board shall
issue its decision within 30 days.
(5) UDC shall notify the board whenever a
mentally ill offender is transferred from the
department to UDC.

ADDENDUM E

TEXT OF FORMER STATUTES

Title I, Chapter 1952, Secti on. «! / „ i.v.rnpi U'ti haw;;,, r.f
Territory of Utah (1876) provided:
(1852.) Sec. 22. All persons are capable of
committing crimes, except those belonging to the
following classes:
F i r s t — C h i l d r e n under the age of seven years;
Second—Children between the ages of seven
and fourteen years in the absence of clear proof
that at the time of committing the act charged
against them they knew its wrongfulness.
Third—Idiots.
Fourth—Lunatics and insane persons.
F i f t h — P e r s o n s who committed the act or made
the omission charged, under an ignorance or
mistake of fact which disproves any criminal
intent;
S i x t h — P e r s o n s who committed the act charged
without being conscious thereof.
S e v e n t h — P e r s o n s who committed the act or
made the omission charged, through misfortune or
by accident, when it appears that there was no
evil design, intention, or culpable negligence.
E i g h t h — M a r r i e d women (unless the crime is
punishable with death) acting under the threats,
command, or coercion of their husbands;
N i n t h — P e r s o n s (unless the crime is
punishable with death) who committed the act or
made the omission charged under threats or
menaces sufficient to show that they had
reasonable cause to, and did believe their lives
would be endangered if they refused.
tv-;*r Compiled Laws of Utah (1888) , §18 52 was renumbered
to §4387 with
language change.
§4387. All persons are capable of
committing crimes, except those belonging tc » the
following classes:

1. Children under the age of seven years.
2. Children between the ages of seven years
and fourteen years in the absence of clear proof
that at the time of committing the act charged
against them they knew its wrongfulness.
3. Idiots.
4. Lunatics and insane persons.

5. Persons who committed the act or made
the omission charged, under an ignorance or
mistake of fact which disproves any criminal
intent.
6. Persons who committed the act charged
without being conscious thereof.
7. Persons who committed the act or made
the omission charged, through misfortune or by
accident, when it appears that there was no evil
design, intention, or culpable negligence.
8. Married women (unless the crime be
punishable by death) acting under the threats,
command or coercion of their husbands.
9. Persons (unless the crime be punishable
with death) who committed the act or made the
omission charged under threats or menaces
sufficient to show that they had reasonable cause
to, and did believe their lives would be
endangered if they refused.
The 1907, 1917, 1933 and 1943 versions of the statute
remained substantively the same, with only a change in numbering.
Penal Code, Chapter 2.7915 (4071); Penal Code §103-1-40.
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-41 (1953) contained the same
substantive language. It provided:
76-1-41. Who are capable of committing
crime.—All persons are capable of committing
crimes, except those belonging to the following
classes:
(1) Children under the age of seven years.
(2) Children between the ages of seven
years and fourteen years, in the absence of clear
proof that at the time of committing the act
charged against them, they knew its wrongfulness.
(3) Idiots.
(4) Lunatics and insane persons.
(5) Persons who commit the act or make the
omission charged under an ignorance or mistake of
fact which disproves any criminal intent.
(6) Persons who commit the act charged
without being conscious thereof.
(7) Persons who commit the act or make the
omission charged through misfortune or by
accident, when it appears that there is no evil
design, intention or culpable negligence.
(8) Married women, unless the crime is
punishable with death, acting under the threats,
command or coercion of their husbands.

(9) Persons, unless the crime is punishable
with death, who commit the act or make the
omission charged under threats or menaces
sufficient to show that they have reasonable
cause to believe, and do believe, their lives
will be endangered if they refuse.
This language remained in effect until 19 73 when the
Legislature adopted Utah Code Ann. §76-2-305. Utah Code Ann.
§76-2-305 (1983) provided:
76-2-305. Mental disease or defect.
(1) In any prosecution for an offense, * +
shall be a defense that the defendant, at the
time of the proscribed conduct, as a result of
mental disease or defect, lacked substantial
capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law.
(2) As used in this section, the terms
"mental disease" or "defect" do not include an
abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal
— otherwise antisocial conduct.

ADDENDUM F

LISA J. REMAL, (#2722)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
MOTION TO DECLARE UTAH
STATUTORY SCHEME IN REGARDS
TO MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND NOTICE
OF HEARING

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 921900092FS
HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MURPHY

MIKELL SWEEZEY,
Defendant.

The defendant, MIKELL SWEEZEY, through his attorney, LISA
J. REMAL, hereby moves this Court to declare the statutory scheme in
regards to mentally ill offenders unconstitutional including, but
not limited to the following statutes:

Utah Code Ann. 76-2-305,

76-5-205(2), 77-14-3, 77-14-4 (Supp. 1990).

Defendant further

requests that this court instruct the jury regarding the defenses of
insanity and diminished capacity.

In support of this motion,

defendant alleges the following specific violations of his state and
federal constitutional rights.
1.

That defendant is denied due process of law as

guaranteed in Article I, Section 7 and 27 of the Utah State
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Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitutions in that defendant is denied the right to
present a defense that is fundamental to our jurisprudence and was
incorporated within the concept of due process at the time due
process was guaranteed to all citizens by passage of the State and
Federal Constitutions.
2.

That defendant is denied due process of law, equal

protection of law, and uniform operation of the laws as guaranteed
in Article I, Section 2, 7, 24, and 27 of the Utah State
Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution in the manner in which §76-2-305 has been
applied.

Defendant specifically alleges that application of

§76-2-305 is inconsistent, and criminal responsibility is imposed
arbitrarily and capriciously and without consideration to actual
culpability, and condemns in an inconsistent manner conduct that is
without fault.

State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988) Utah

Code Ann. 76-1-104(2)(4 ) (Supp. 1990).
3.

That Defendant is denied equal protection of the law,

and uniform operation of laws is guaranteed by the above-cited
Federal and States constitutions in that the following statutes
discriminate against mentally ill persons charged with crimes:
A)

Under §76-5-205(2) Defendant as a mentally ill

person is denied the right to mitigation of the offenses charged in
Count I that is afforded to other persons similarly situated.
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B)

Defendant as a mentally ill person is forced to

waive his right to remain silent and not give evidence against
himself and may be precluded from contesting an element of the
offense if he chooses not to give evidence against himself.
C)

Under §76-2-305, because Defendant is a mentally

ill person, an element of the offense is converted to an affirmative
defense and the state may be able to prove its case with a different
and lesser standard of proof than would be required if the Defendant
were not mentally ill.
4.

Utah Code Ann. 76-l-502(b) (1990 Supp).

That treatment of Defendant and other mentally ill

offenders under the Utah statutory scheme constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment and unnecessary rigor in violation of Article I,
Section 9 of the Utah State Constitution and the Eighth Amendment to
the United States Constitution in the following particulars.
A)

Failure to recognize a different standard for

imposing responsibility when the Defendant because of mental illness
is unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, or is
unable to conform conduct to the requirements of law, constitutes
unnecessary rigor, and is contrary to the fundamental principles
upon which our constitution was conceived.

Article I section 27,

Utah State Constitution.
B)

Failure to recognize the need for disparate

treatment or punishment for mentally ill offenders constitutes cruel
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and unusual punishment and unnecessary rigor and is contrary to the
fundamental principles upon which our constitution was conceived.
Article I Section 27, Utah State Constitution.
5.

That under §76-2-305 an element of the offense is

converted to an affirmative defense thereby relieving the State of
the obligation to overcome the presumption of innocense and bring
forth evidence to prove all the elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt in violation of Defendant's State and Federal
Constitutional right to due process of law.

In Re Winship 397 O.S.

358 (1970) Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) 76-2-308,
76-1-502 (2Mb).
DATED this J)

day of March, 1992.

Vnsa ^\.(LnJ

LISA J-/REMAL
Attorney for Defendant

NOTICE OF HEARING
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT:
You and each of you please take notice that the
above-entitled matter will come on regularly for hearing on
Wednesday, the 25th day of March, 1992, at the hour of 1:30 p.m.
before the honorable MICHAEL R. MURPHY.

Please govern yourselves

accordingly.
DATED this b

day of March, 1992.

m^—«*„

LISA J. REMAL, (#2722)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MOTION TO DECLARE 77-14-4
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND NOTICE
OF HEARING

V.
MIKELL SWEEZEY,

Case No. 921900092FS
HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MURPHY

Defendant.

The Defendant, MIKELL SWEEZEY, through his attorney,
LISA J. REMAL, hereby moves this court to find Utah Code Ann.
77-14-4 (Supp. 1990) unconstitutional.

Defendant specifically

alleges that subsection (2) which requires that Defendant make
himself available and fully cooperate in an examination by the Utah
State Department of Human Services, constitutes a violation of
Defendant's right not to be compelled to be a witness against
himself as guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and his right not to give evidence against himself as
guaranteed in Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution.
See also 77-1-6 (2)(c).
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Defendant alleges that the provisions of the statute which
provide that failure to make himself available and cooperate may
result in a bar to presenting expert testimony relating to his
defense of mental illness is a denial of Due Process of Law as
guaranteed in Article I Sections 7 and 27 of the Utah State
Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution
DATED this

O

day of March, 1992.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED:

LISA JU REMAL
Attorney for Defendant
NOTICE OF HEARING

TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT:
You and each of you please take notice that the
above-entitled matter will come on regularly for hearing on
Wednesday, the 25th day of March, 1992, at the hour of 1:30 p.m.
before the Honorable MICHAEL R. MURPHY.

Please govern yourselves

accordingly.
DATED this b

day of March, 1992.

J
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JAMES C. BRADSHAW (#3768)
MARK R. MOFFAT (#5112)
RICHAR MADRO (#5402)
Attorneys for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDERS ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801-532-5444
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

v.

MOTION TO DECLARE UTAH
STATUTORY SCHEME IN REGARDS
TO MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL

TOMAS R. HERRERA,
Defendant

JUDGE JOHN A. ROKICH
Case 911901075FS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff

The defendant, TOMAS R. HERRERA, through his attorneys,
JAMES C. BRADSHAW, MARK R. MOFFAT and RICHARD MAURO, hereby moves
this court to declare the statutory scheme in regards to mentally
ill offenders unconstitutional including, but not limited to the
following statutes: Utah Code Ann. 76-2-305, 76-5-205(2), 77-14-3,
77-14-4 (Supp. 1990).

Defendant further requests that this court

allow him to present evidence, and that the court instruct the jury
regarding the defenses of insanity and diminished capacity.

In

support of this motion, defendant alleges the following specific
violations of his state and federal constitutional rights.
1.

That defendant is denied due process of law as

guaranteed in Article I, Sections 7 and 27 of the Utah State
Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitutions in that defendant is denied the right to

,»n0?S

present a defense that is fundamental to our jurisprudence and was
incorporated within the concept of due process at the time due
process was guaranteed to all citizens by passage of the State and
Federal Constitutions.
2.

That defendant is denied due process of law, equal

protection of law, and uniform operation of the laws as guaranteed
in Article I Sections 2, 7, 24 and 27 of the Utah State Constitution
and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution in that the manner in which 76-2-305 has been applied.
Defendant specifically alleges that application of 76-2-305, is
inconsistent, and criminal responsibility is imposed arbitrarily and
capriciously and without consideration to actual culpability, and
condemns in an inconsistent manner conduct that is without fault.
State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988) (Utah 1988) Utah Code
Ann. 76-1-104 (2)(4) (Supp. 1990)
3.

That Defendant is denied equal protection of the law,

and uniform operation of laws as guaranteed in the Federal and
States constitutions (Supra) in that the following statutes
discriminate against mentally ill persons charged with crimes:
A)

Under 76-5-205(2) Defendant as a mentally ill person

is denied the right to mitigation of the offenses charged in Counts
I, II and III that is afforded to other persons similarly situated.
B)

Defendant as a mentally ill person is forced to

waive his right to remain silent and not give evidence against
himself and may be precluded from contesting an element of
-2-
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the offense if he chooses not to give evidence against himself.
C)

Under 76-2-305, because Defendant is a mentally ill

person, an element of the offense is converted to an affirmative
defense and the state may be able to prove its case with a different
and lesser standard of proof than would be required if the Defendant
were not mentally ill.
5.

Utah Code Ann. 76-l-502(b) (1990 Supp).

That treatment of Defendant and other mentally ill

offenders under the Utah statutory scheme constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment and unnecessary rigor in violation of Article I,
Section 9 of the Utah State Constitution and the Eight Amendment to
the United States Constitution in the following particulars.
A)

Failure to recognize a different standard for

imposing responsibility when the Defendant because of mental illness
is unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, or is
unable to conform conduct to the requirements of law, constitutes
unnecessary rigor, and is contrary to the fundamental pricipals upon
which our constitution was conceived.

Article I section 27 Utah

State Constitution.
B)

Failure to recognzie the need for disparate

treatment or punishment for menally ill offenders constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment and unnecessary rigor and is contrary to the
fundamental pricipals upon which our constitution was concieved.
Article I Section 27, Utah State Constitution.
6.

That under 76-2-305 an element of the offense is

converted to an affirmative defense thereby relieving the State of
its obligation to overcome the presumption of innocense and bring
-3-
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forth evidence to prove all the elements of the elements of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt in violation of Defendant's State
and Federal Constitutional right to due process of law.

in Re

Winship 397 U.S. 358 (1970) Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975)
76-2-308,

76-1-502
DATED this

(2)(b).
/f ^ day of August, 1991.

^AMES'C. BRADSHAW
Lttoxney for Defendant

MARK 0*rHOI
Attorney for"Defendant

RICHARD MAURO
Attorney for Defendant

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the
County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
this

day of August, 1991.
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JAMES C. BRADSHAW (#3768)
MARK R. MOFFAT (#5112)
RICHARD MAURO (#5402)
Attorneys for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDERS ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake Cicy, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801-532-5444
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff

MOTION TO DECLARE
77-14-4 UNCONSITUTIONAL

v.
TOMAS R. HERRERA,
Defendant

JUDGE JOHN A. ROKICH
Case 911901075FS

The Defendant, TOMAS R. HERRERA, through his attorneys,
JAMES C. BRADSHAW, MARK R. MOFFAT and RICHARD MAURO, hereby moves
this court to find Utah Code Ann. 77-14-4 (Supp. 1990)
unconstitutional.

Defendant specifically alleges that subsection

(2) which requires that Defendant make himself available and fully
cooperate in an examination by the Utah State Department of Human
Services,

constitutes a violation of Defendant's right not to be

compelled to be a witness against himself and guaranteed in the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and his right not
to give evidence against himself as guaranteed in Article I, Section
12 of the Utah State Constitution, See also 77-1-6 (2)(c).
Defendant alleges that the provisions of the statute which
provide that failure to make himself available and cooperate may
result in a bar to presenting expert testimony relating to his

<>i»030

defense of mental illness is a denial of Due Process of Law as
guaranteed in Article I Sections 7 and 27 of the Utah State
Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.

2&K

DATED this /'i

v

flay of August, 1991.

Respectfully

submitted,

C. BRADSHAW

Att/orney for Defendant

(/i.'M. h. ...
MARKER. MOFFfhW

Attorney for Defendant

RICHARD MAURO "
Attorney for Defendant

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the
County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
this

//<{ day of August, 1991.

-2-

ADDENDUM G

DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
BARBARA J. BYRNE, Bar No. 3920
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

APR 2 0 1S92
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
Case No. 921900092FS

v.
MIKEIL SWEEZEY,

Hon. Michael R. Murphey
Defendant.
Regarding the defendant's Motion to Declare UCA 76-2-305
Unconstitutional, based on memoranda submitted by both parties and
oral argument heard on March 25 and 30 and on April 8, 1992, the
Court now Orders that the defendant's motion is denied.
The Court specifically holds that:
1) UCA 76-2-305 is Constitutional because
of the presumption of Constitutionality
that attaches to legislative enactments.
2)
That
although
the
right
of the
defendant
to
present
a
-traditionalinsanity defense may rise to the level of a
fundamental right, UCA 76-2-305 offends
neither the United States nor the Utah
Constitutions as long as it is read in
conjunction
with
UCA
77-16a-2,
which
provides for a verdict of guilty and
mentally ill.

0217

ORDER
Case No. 921900092FS
Page 2
3) That UCA 77-14-3 and 4 do not violate
the
defendant's
rights
against
self-incrimination as guaranteed by the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution or Article I,
Section 7 of the Utah Constitution.
Dated this <JO

day of April, 1992.

Approved as to Form:

Lisa ReWal, Esq.
Counsel for Defendant

u
MICHAEL R. MURPF&, Jud§e /
Third District Court
/
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R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS (3039)
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capital
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801)538-1021

APR 0 3 1992
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DAVID E. YOCUM
County Attorney
CHARLES D. BEHRENS, Jr. (5176)
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)363-7900
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:

v.

:

TOMAS R. HERRERA,

:

Case No. 911901075
JUDGE JOHN A. ROKICH
Defendant.

:

This matter came on for hearings on September 11, 1991,
December 6, 1991, and February 3, 1992, before the Honorable John
A. Rokich, Judge, Third District Court, on defendant's "Motion to
Declare 77-14-4 Unconstitutional" and
Statutory

Scheme

Unconstitutional."

in

Regards

to

"Motion to Declare Utah
Mentally

Defendant was present

111

Offenders

and represented

by

counsel, James C. Bradshaw, Mark R. Moffat and Richard Mauro, Salt
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Lake Legal Defenders Association.

The State was represented by

Christine F. Soltis, Assistant Utah Attorney General, Charles D.
Behrens, Jr. and John N. Spikes, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorneys.
Having heard the evidence presented and the arguments of the
parties,

and

having

reviewed

and

considered

the

memoranda

submitted, the Court, being fully advised in the premises, enters
the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. That defendant is charged with one count of Murder, a
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203
(Supp. 1991), and two counts of Attempted Murder, second degree
felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1991),
which latter charges are also charged under the firearm enhanced
penalty provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1990).
2.

That the basis of the charges is that on June 6,

1991, defendant entered his former girlfriend's home and shot her
twice in the head.

Defendant also shot at but missed the victim's

mother and brother.
3.

That on August 9, 1991, defendant entered a not

guilty plea to the information.

Trial was set for January 21,

1992.
4.

That on August 19, 1991, defendant filed a document

entitled "Notice of Intent to Contest an Element of the Offense."
2

In it, defendant stated "his intention at trial to present evidence
including the testimony of mental health experts, to demonstrate
that there exists a reasonable doubt as to the States

[sic]

allegation that Defendant acted intentionally and knowingly as
charged in counts I, II and III of the information."

Defendant

then asserted that he would "not present any 'affirmative defense'
in regards to mental state" and was therefore "not bound by the
notice provisions of of [sic] Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-3 (1) (Supp.
1990) [sic]."

No memorandum or statement of facts accompanied the

motion.
5.
entitled

That on August 19, 1991, defendant filed a document

"Motion to Declare 77-14-4 Unconstitutional" in which

defendant claimed that the psychiatric examination mandated under
Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-4 (Supp. 1991) violated his federal and
state constitutional rights to not "be a witness against himself"
and to "not give evidence against himself."

No memorandum or

statement of facts accompanied the motion.
6.

That at the same time, defendant filed a third

document entitled

"Motion to Declare Utah Statutory Scheme in

Regards Mentally 111 Offenders Unconstitutional," which motion
sought to declare as unconstitutional Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305
(1990) (defining the defense of mental illness), Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-205(2) #(1990) (emotional disturbance manslaughter), Utah Code
3

Ann. § 77-14-3 (1990) (requiring a defendant to give notice if he
intends to rely on the defense of mental illness or diminished
capacity), and Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-4 (mandating a psychiatric
examination for defendants who provide notice under § 77-14-3 that
they intend to rely on the defense of insanity) . No memorandum or
statement of facts accompanied the motion.
7.
without

That the State moved to dismiss defendant's motions

prejudice on the basis that defendant had

failed to

establish any facts from which it might be assumed that the sanity
of defendant would be at issue at trial. The State contended that
before a defendant can attack the constitutionality of statutes, he
must

establish

that he would be adversely affected by those

statutes such that an actual case and controversy exists.
8. That on September 11, 1991, the Court, as a courtesy
to one of the defense counsel who was leaving the state, permitted
an evidentiary hearing to be held on defendant's motions subject to
a continuing objection by the State.
9.

That at the commencement of the hearing, both in

chambers and in open court, the Court informed defendant that he
must present some factual basis from which the Court could conclude
that the defense of insanity was at issue in the case or that
defendant

was

otherwise

adversely

affected

by

the

statutes

challenged.^ The Court informed defendant that the mere fact that
4

defendant was criminally charged was insufficient to provide the
requisite

procedural

basis

judgment

that

declaratory

to

seek

specific

what

in

criminal

essence
statutes

was

a

were

unconstitutional.
10.

That the Court informed counsel that any expert

testifying during the hearing would be subject to cross-examination
concerning the basis of his opinion as permitted under rule 705,
Utah Rules of Evidence.

The State agreed that any of defendant's

statements concerning the crime made to the experts were subject to
fifth amendment protections.
11. That defense counsel then proffered, "simply for the
standing issue," that if asked, Dr. Breck LeBegue, a qualified
psychiatric expert, would testify that he:
has done evaluations of Mr. Herrera; that he
continues to evaluate him; as a result of that
evaluation, he has concluded that Mr. Herrera,
at the time that this offense occurred, was
suffering from a mental illness; and further,
that as a result of that mental illness, if
the standard to be applied were the A.L.I,
test of insanity, that he would find, that he
would conclude, that Mr. Herrera was insane
and not criminally responsible at the time of
the offense which is before the court
occurred.
As to whether defendant would fit within the existing statutorydefinition of mental illness, counsel proffered that Dr. LeBegue
was "unable to reach a definitive conclusion in regards to that
issue at this point of time."
5

12. That defendant then called Dr. LeBegue to testify to
other matters but refused to allow Dr. LeBegue to be questioned in
regard to the proffer or the basis of his conclusions and opinions,
if any, concerning defendant's sanity.
13.

That Dr. LeBegue's testimony was therefore limited

to general observations concerning the definition and application
of insanity in criminal trials without any reference to the facts
of this case or defendant's mental state.

Dr. LeBegue testified

that he has performed mental evaluations in different jurisdictions
utilizing varying definitions of mental illness. Both in Utah and
Idaho, he has performed mental evaluations utilizing the current
Utah-type "mens rea" definition of mental illness. In those cases,
Dr. LeBegue was able to reach psychiatric conclusions under the
legal definition.
14.

That Dr. LeBegue testified that under the current

Utah definition of mental illness some delusional offenders could
be found "not guilty by reason of insanity" while others could be
found

"guilty and mentally ill."

For example, a delusional

offender who nevertheless intended to kill a human being could be
found "guilty and mentally ill," while a delusional offender who
did not

intend to kill a human being, i.e., thought he was

attacking
insanity."

a

tree,

could

be

found

"not

guilty by reason of

In Dr. LeBegue's opinion, both offenders would be
6
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similar from a psychiatric point of view.

Dr. LeBegue did not

testify that defendant was delusional.
15.

That the Division of Mental Health, Utah State

Department of Human Services, is currently in the process of
creating a list of licensed mental health professionals throughout
the state to perform competency and mental examinations pursuant to
§

77-14-4.

Additionally,

the Division

of Mental

Health

is

attempting to establish minimum procedures to be utilized in such
examinations.

Dr. LeBegue testified about his concerns regarding

the standard fees contemplated for such examinations, the forensic
qualifications of any examiner, and the number of examiners to be
appointed in a given

case. Dr. LeBegue testified that as long as

two forensic examiners were appointed for purposes of determining
sanity

under

§

77-14-4,

the

current

statutory

examination

procedures would be appropriate.
16.

That at the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing,

counsel for defendant represented that he would submit an affidavit
of Dr. LeBegue to support the proffer previously made.

The Court

then ordered supportive memoranda to be submitted.
17.

That on September 16, 1991, defendant submitted a

memorandum in support of his motions, as delineated in paragraphs
4, 5, and 6. All the issues raised by defendant were addressed in
defendant's memoranda and/or argued to the Court.
7
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18.

That on October 16, 1991, the State submitted its

memorandum in opposition to defendant's motions. The State renewed
its motion

to dismiss

on

the basis

that

defendant

had not

established that he was relying on the defense of insanity at trial
or that he would be restricted from presenting any evidence at
trial such that the challenged statutes adversely affected him.
19.
scheduled

That on November 29, 1991, one week before the

final

argument

on

defendant's

motions,

defendant

submitted a reply memorandum which included an affidavit of Dr.
LeBegue.

In the affidavit, Dr. LeBegue concluded that "Tomas

Herrera was 'insane,' as that term was legally defined in Utah
prior to 1983, at the time of the commission of the present
offense."

Continuing, Dr. LeBegue stated that in his opinion

"legitimate issues as to Defendant's sanity at the time of the
commission of the offense" existed but that he was "unable to state
with certainty whether Tomas Herrera would qualify for the defense
of insanity as presently defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305
(1991) [sic]."
20.

That

additionally,

defendant

attached

to his

November 29, 1991, reply memorandum a statement of a lay witness
that when defendant ingested drugs and alcohol, he became "crazy."
21. That on December 6, 1991, during the scheduled final
argument of defendant's motions, defendant amended his plea to
8

"guilty, or, in the alternative, not guilty by reason of insanity."
However, defendant continued to assert that he was not subject to
the notice or examination procedures of §§ 77-14-3 and -4.
22.

That based on the amended plea on December 6, 1991,

the State conceded that defendant had established that defendant's
insanity would be at issue in his trial and had, therefore,
established his standing to challenge the facial constitutionality
of Utah's definition of insanity as well as the examination
procedures to which he was now subject.

The State continued to

challenge defendant's other constitutional arguments as being
without factual context or support. The Court adopted the State's
position.
23.
testified
parties,

That based on the facts related in the memoranda,

to by Dr. LeBegue and proffered and argued by the
the

court

finds

solely

for purposes

of determining

defendant's motions and not as a determination of defendant's
criminal culpability, if any, that:
(a) Defendant entered Claudia Martinez's home, shot
her twice in the head and shot at, but missed, her mother and
brother.
(b) Defendant was arrested approximately fifteen to
twenty minutes later in possession of a revolver-style handgun.
(c)

After being advised of his Miranda rights,
9
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defendant admitted to the police that he decided to shoot Claudia
and went to her home with his gun for that purpose.

Specifically,

defendant was interrogated by the police on June 6, 1991 from 3:57
a.m. until 5:20 a.m.

The interrogation was taped in part.

During

an untaped portion of the interrogation, defendant related that on
the night of the shooting he had been visiting "some girl" and the
"something snapped, something happened to him and he decided to go
to the Martinez house to shoot Claudia."
(d)

Defendant's blood was drawn approximately six

hours after the shootings.

Subsequent chemical analysis did not

reveal the presence of alcohol or drugs.
(e) Until his amended plea of "not guilty by reason
of insanity," defendant has consistently insisted that he was not
relying on the defense of insanity.
(f)

Other than his amended plea, defendant has

presented no evidence that he intends on relying on the defense of
insanity at trial.
(g) The proffer of Dr. LeBegue's testimony and the
submission of his affidavit do not address the question of whether
a controversy concerning defendant's sanity presently exists. At
best, Dr. LeBegue's opinion is that defendant suffers from an
undisclosed mental illness, and that under pre-1983 mental illness
definitions, defendant could be deemed insane. Dr. LeBegue has no
10
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opinion as to whether defendant is legally insane under current
definitions.

The usefulness of this opinion in determining the

issues at bar is extremely limited in that there is no evidence of
what category or degree of mental illness defendant suffers, the
effect of that mental illness on the acts in question, and the
basis from which Dr. LeBegue concludes that defendant would have
previously qualified for a defense. Nor does the opinion set forth
why Dr. LeBegue is unable to reach a conclusion as to defendant's
status under current law. Due to defendant's refusal to allow any
examination of Dr. LeBegue concerning the basis of his opinion, as
allowable under rule 705, Utah Rules of Evidence, there is no
evidence from which to evaluate the validity and applicability of
the doctor's opinion to the facts of this case.
(h)

The affidavit of Reuben Martinez does not support

that defendant's sanity will be at issue at trial. The Court finds
that the statements are merely common generalizations of a lay
witness and gives no credence to them.
(g)

The statements of defendant's counsel during oral

argument on December 6, 1991, and February 3, 1992, that defendant
is a "paranoid schizophrenic" and suffers from "hallucinations" and
"delusions"

are

simply

assertions

of

counsel

without

any

evidentiary support and, therefore, are not considered by the
Court.
11

Having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court
enters its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Based on defendant's amended plea of not guilty by

reason of insanity and Dr. LeBegue's affidavit that legitimate
issues exist concerning defendant's sanity, the Court concludes
that defendant has established that it is likely that his sanity
will be at issue in any trial of this matter.
2.

Based on the Court's Conclusion in Paragraph 1 that

defendant's sanity will be at issue, the Court concludes that
defendant is subject to the notice provisions of Utah Code Ann. §
77-14-3 and the examination provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-4.
3.

The Court concludes, therefore, that defendant has

standing to challenge the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 762-305 (defining mental illness), Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-3 (the
notice provision) and Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-4 (mental examination
provision).
4.

The

Court

concludes,

however,

that

defendant

currently lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1990) (manslaughter statute) or the statutory
sentencing scheme for guilty and mentally ill offenders in that
defendant has not established that he is subject to the challenged
statutes.

State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203 (Utah 1989) (relying on
12

Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983)); State v. Tebbs, 786
P.2d 775 (Utah App. 1990).

Defendant is charged under the murder

statute and has not established that he could be culpable under any
lesser

included

offense.

Similarly, defendant

has not been

convicted of any crime nor established any basis from which to
assume that his mental condition, if any, would require postconviction treatment. Therefore, neither of defendant's claims are
ripe for adjudication.

Adelman v. Lynch, 815 P.2d 741 (Utah App.

1991) (relying on Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake City Comm'm., 624 P.2d
1138 (Utah 1981).
5.

The Court concludes that defendant has presented no

basis from which to conclude that the statutory definition of
mental illness found in Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 is facially
unconstitutional.

Neither the Utah nor federal

constitution

mandates a single definition of mental illness. Leland v. Oregon,
343 U.S. 790 (1952).

Compare standards enunciated in State v.

DePlontv, 749 P.2d 621 (Utah 1987), with State v. Green, 6 P.2d 177
(Utah 1931), and Territory v. Calton, 5 U. 451, 16 P. 902 (1888).
Instead, it has been left to the prerogative of the states to
define mental illness for purposes of criminal culpability based on
evolving medical and community standards.
U.S. 514 (1968).

Powell v. Texas, 392

Section 76-2-305 absolves a defendant of criminal

responsibility when, due to mental illness or diminished capacity,
13

he

lacks

the

requisite mental

state

for the

crime

charged.

Defendant has failed to show any deprivation of due process under
such a definition.
6.
present

The Court concludes that defendant has failed to

any basis

from which to conclude that the statutory

definition of mental illness found in Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305
relieves the State of any burden of proof.
Supreme

Court

has

clearly

rejected

The United States

defendant's

argument

in

concluding that due process allows a state to require that a
criminal defendant initially raise the defense of insanity. Leland
v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790; Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197
(1977).

The

Idaho

Supreme

Court,

in

ruling

on

essentially identical to Utah's, has similarly ruled.

a

statute
State v.

Beam, 710 P.2d 526 (Idaho 1985).

Utah case law throughout this

century

no

has

consistently

found

constitutional

defect

in

requiring a defendant to raise the defense of insanity. State v.
Green, 6 P.2d 177.

The Court concludes that § 76-2-305 does not

relieve the State of its constitutional burden of proof nor imposes
on defendant any "new" burden.
7.

The Court concludes that defendant has failed to

present any basis from which to conclude that Utah Code Ann. § 762-305 is arbitrary and capricious.

While Dr. LeBegue testified

that some delusional offenders may now be found "not guilty by
14

reason of insanity" while others may be found "guilty and mentally
ill," defendant has failed to establish that such a distinction is
constitutionally impermissible. The Court concludes that the legal
standard of mental illness for purposes of criminal culpability is
not constitutionally required to embrace all medical definitions of
mental illness.

See Conclusion No. 4, supra.

Green, 6 P.2d 177.
was

presented

that

See also State v.

Further, -he Court concludes that no evidence
defendant

is a

delusional

offender

and,

therefore, there is no bas.5 from which to conclude that the
statute is arbitrary as app.ied.
8.

The Court concludes that defendant has presented no

basis from which to conclude that the notice and examination
procedures outlined in Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-14-3 and -4 are
facially unconstitutional.

Essentially identical provisions have

existed in Utah since 1973. No Utah appellate court has found such
provisions to be constitutionally defective.

The Court concludes

that these provisions embody the long-standing concept that the
sanity of a criminal defendant will be presumed unless a defendant
raises the issue of his alleged insanity.

State v. Romero, 684

P.2d 643 (Utah 1984) I citing State v. Green, 6 P.2d 177). Further,
the provisions codify the procedural safeguards of a fair trial for
all parties by requiring pretrial disclosure of expert testimony.
Defendant has failed to show any deprivation of due process under
15

these requirements.
9.

The Court concludes that defendant has failed to

present any basis from which to conclude that Utah Code Ann. § 7714-4 violates his rights against self-incrimination under either
the federal or state constitution.

The privilege against self-

incrimination prohibits the use of unconstitutionally compelled
evidence. However, both the United States and Utah Supreme Courts
have rejected

the claim that a mental examination

itself is

unconstitutional on fifth amendment grounds. Estelle v. Smith, 451
U.S. 454

(1981); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d

Instead,

defendant's

argument

must

be

439

limited

(Utah 1988).
either

to an

assertion of the constitutional privilege in response to a specific
question during the examination, or to the restriction of the
prosecution's use at trial of defendant's compelled incriminatory
statements. For these reasons, the Court concludes that defendant
must submit to a mental examination pursuant to § 77-14-4.

The

report from this examination, as well as Dr. LeBegue's examination,
will be submitted to the Court.
reports

and

delete

or

The Court will then review the

otherwise

restrict

the

use

of

any

constitutionally privileged information.
WHEREFORE,
prejudice.
pursuant

defendant's

motions

are

denied

without

Defendant is ordered to submit to a mental examination

to, § 77-14-4.

Said examination
16

shall be conducted

independently by two qualified forensic psychiatric examiners. At
defendant's option, one of those examiners may be Dr. LeBegue or
defendant may elect to retain Dr. LeBegue as a defense expert. The
reports of any psychiatric examinations of defendant will be
submitted to the Court for purposes of making a determination as to
whether the reports contain constitutionally privileged materials.
If so, the Court will mask, delete or otherwise restrict the use of
said materials by the State during its case-in-chief.
DATED this

^

day of 4teL®**> 1992.
BY THE COURT:

\ HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH
VTHixd District Court Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

MARK R. MOFFAT
RICHARD P. MAURO
Attorneys for Defendant
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LISA J. REMAL (#2722)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

5o?M'3t

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

AFFIDAVIT OF DR. BRECK LEBEGUE

Plaintiff,
v.
MIKELL SWEEZEY,

Case No. 921900092FS
HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MURPHY

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OP SALT LAKE

)

ss

Dr. Breck LeBegue, being first duly sworn, deposes and
states as follows:
1.

I am a psychiatrist licensed to practice in the State

2.

I specialize in the field of forensic psychiatry and

of Utah.

have extensive training and experience in the field of forensic
psychiatry.
3.

I have previously testified as an expert in the field

of forensic psychiatry in various courts in the State of Utah, as
well as courts in the State of Wyoming and California.
4.

I am familiar with the various legal definitions of

insanity, including the "M'Naughten" standard of insanity and the
"ALI" standard of insanity.

0091

5.

I am familiar with the legal definition of insanity as

it existed in Utah prior to 1983.

I am also familiar with Utah's

present legal definition of insanity.
6*

I have evaluated many people who have been charged with

criminal offenses; the purpose of those evaluations has been, in
part, to determine if those people qualified for defenses of
insanity or diminished capacity.
7.

Of those I have evaluated, many have been mentally ill;

the majority of the mentally ill offenders I have evaluated have
been charged with some type of assault, or with murder.
8.

Of the mentally ill offenders I have evaluated, the

majority of them have been diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenic.
9.

Many schizophrenic offenders I have evaluated committed

violent criminal acts because of a false perception of reality
caused by their mental illness.
10.

The offenders I have evaluated who suffered from

delusions fell into two distinct categories:
A.

The first category is for those mentally ill

offenders v/hose delusions cause them to commit violent acts against
another person, but even in their delusions they are intentionally
or knowingly harming or killing a person, although the delusions
distort the actual people involved, or the real situation.
B.

The second category is for those mentally ill

offenders whose delusions also cause them to commit violent acts
against another person, but they have the delusional belief that
they are harming or killing something that is not human.

r.roo
1
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Neither group of offenders is more mentally ill than

the other; both groups are equally in need of treatment; the
delusions seem equally real for both groups of offenders; each group
has the same inability to comprehend the wrongfulness of their acts;
each group is equally unable to control their behavior; the threat
of punishment will deter neither group from acting in accordance
with their delusions.
12.

Under current Otah law, only the second category of

mentally ill offenders qualifies for a defense of insanity, even
though the only difference between the two groups is the content of
their delusions which are caused by their mental illness.
13.

Under other legal definitions of insanity, including

the "M'Naughten" standard and the "ALI" standard, some of the
offenders from both categories would have legally qualified for the
defense of insanity.
14.

I have been retained by the Salt Lake Legal Defender's

Association for the purpose of performing psychological tests and
evaluations on the defendant, Mikell Sweezey.
15.

As part of my evaluation, I have administered

psychological tests to Mikell Sweezey.

I have also interviewed him

personally and have reviewed Defendant's medical and psychological
records.

I have also reviewed the police reports regarding his

pending Attempted Murder charge.
16.

Based on my evaluation, I am of the opinion that

Mikell Sweezey was suffering from a mental illness at the time of
the commission of the present offense.
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17.

Based on my evaluations I am of the opinion that Mikell

Sweezey would qualify for the affirmative defense of insanity as
that defense existed in Utah prior to 1983.

I am of the opinion

that Mikell Sweezey was "insane", as that term was legally defined
in Utah prior to 1983, at the time of the commission of the present
offense.
18.

Based on my evaluations to date, Mikell Sweezy would not

qualify for the defense of insanity as presently defined by Utah
Code Ann.
19.

76-2-305 (1991).
Based on my evaluations to date I believe that there are

legitimate issues as to Defendant's sanity at the time of the
commission of the offense.

Dated this

day of March, 1992.

Breck Lebegue
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me t h i s
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day o f March,
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MARK R. MOFFAT (5112)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
532-5444
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDIffIA3XPI

Deputy CitrK

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
AFFIDAVIT OF DR. BRECK
LeBEGUE

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff
V.

Case No. 911001837FS
JUDGE JOHN A. ROKICH

TOMAS HERRERA,
Defendant
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

:ss
)

Dr. Breck LeBegue, being first duly sworn, deposes and
states as follows:
1.

I am a psychiatrist licensed to practice in the State

2.

I specialize in the field of forensic psychiatry and

of Utah.

have extensive training and experience in the field of forensic
psychiatry.
3.

I have previously testified as an expert in the field

of forensic psychiatry in various courts in the State of Utah, as
well as courts in the State of Wyoming and California.
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4.

I am familiar with the various legal definitions of

insanity, including the "M'Naughten" standard of insanity and the
"ALI" standard of insanity.
5.

I am familiar with the legal definition of insanity as

it existed in Utah prior to 1983.

I am also familiar with Utah's

present legal definition of insanity.
6.

I have been retained by the Salt Lake Legal Defender's

Association for the purpose of performing psychological tests and
evaluations on the defendant, Tomas Herrera.
7.

As part of my evaluations, I have administered

psychological tests to Tomas Herrera.

I have also interviewed him

personally and have reviewed Defendant's medical and psychological
records.

I have also discussed Mr. Herrera's case with his

attorneys and have reviewed notes and memoranda they have forwarded
to me.
8.

Based on my evaluations, I am of the opinion that Tomas

Herrera was suffering from a mental illness at the time of the
commission of the present offense.
9.

Based on my evaluations I am of the opinion that Tomas

Herrera would qualify for the affirmative defense of insanity as
that defense existed in Utah prior to 1983. I am of the opinion that
Tomas Herrera was "insane", as that term was legally defined in Utah
prior to 1983, at the time of the commission of the present offense.
10.

Based on my evaluations to date, I am unable to state

with certainty whether Tomas Herrera would qualify for the defense
of insanity as presently defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 (1991).
11.

Based on my evaluations to date I believe that there

are legitimate issues as to Defendant's sanity at the time of the
commission of the offense.

7*?

DATED this

day of

Af*/ . 1 9 9 1 .
BRECK LeBEGUE

SUBSCRIBED
ouDowrt

AND SWORN to before me this

day of

1991.
NOTARY Vb&VC
SANDRA.I. HAflBwUN
50 North Mfidfc?( Orlvo
S.L.C., UT 34132
COMMISSION EXPIRES
JULY 18,1fiB4
*TATE OF UTAH
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